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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation investigates whether No Child Left Behind (NCLB) has made public 
schools operate more efficiently. The interest in measuring technical efficiency in education dates 
back to the beginning of the twentieth century when educators began to adopt business values 
and practices into education (Callahan, 1962). In the 1990s an increasing number of researchers 
began to employ advanced measurement techniques to empirically estimate technical efficiency 
when a debate began on whether money matters in improving student achievement led by 
Hanushek, et al. (1996) and Greenwald, et al. (1996). The final conclusion of this debate was that 
there was no strong evidence to support the hypothesis that educational inputs, such as 
educational expenditure, have positive impact on educational outcomes, such as students’ test 
scores. Thus, the lack of conclusive evidence on the positive relationship between educational 
expenditure and student achievement, together with the fact that the substantial rise of 
educational expenditure over time does not correspond to an equal increase of student test scores 
(Lips, Watkins, & Fleming, 2008), made some scholars argued that resources in schools are not 
utilized efficiently (Hanushek, 1986).  
During this period, researchers began to adopt measurement methods that are found to 
adequately estimate inefficiency in private sectors and apply them to public sectors, such as local 
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governments (Geys & Moesen, 2009), hospitals (Ozcan, Luke, & Haksever, 1992), police 
departments (Parks, 2005), as well as education (Bessent, Bessent, Kennington, & Reagan, 1982; 
Chakraborty, Biswas, & Lewis, 2001; Grosskopf, Hayes, Taylor, & Weber, 1997; Noulas & 
Ketkar, 1998). No matter what types of measurement methods are used, parametric or 
non-parametric, empirical studies reached a similar conclusion that production in educational 
settings was inefficient. In other words, those studies suggested that schools (or school districts), 
the unit of producing educational outcomes, did not use resources to their optimal level. For 
instance, school districts in New Jersey were found to be 81% efficient (Noulas & Ketkar, 1998), 
implying that school districts could have achieved 19% more outputs if they utilized their 
resources to the optimal level. Similar results were found for school districts in Utah whose 
average technical efficiency was 86% (Chakraborty, Biswas, & Lewis, 2001). 
Despite the finding that inefficiency in education exists, few studies have offered the 
determinants of inefficiency, or suggested the remedies for increasing technical efficiency of 
public education. Some scholars (Grosskopf, Hayes, Taylor, & Weber, 2001; Ruggiero, 
Duncombe, & Miner, 1995) have attempted to investigate the determinants of inefficiency in 
education based on several theories of inefficiency in public services, including the 
X-inefficiency theory of Leibenstein (Leibenstein, 1966), budget-maximising bureaucrats theory 
of Niskanen (Niskanen, 1968, 1971), and the principal-agent theory. According to these theories, 
inefficiency in public sectors arise because of the imperfect competition market of public 
organizations (Leibenstein, 1966), the excessive cost of outputs caused by the 
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budget-maximizing behavior of bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1968, 1971), or the failure to choose 
best-performing agent due to the asymmetric information between principal and agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
All in all, the theories of inefficiency in public services imply that lack of incentives and/or 
monitoring mechanisms for individuals to perform optimally is the primary cause of inefficiency 
in education. Therefore, it is expected that schools or school districts can improve their technical 
efficiency if there are accountability incentives that monitor school administrators and teachers’ 
behavior. Currently available empirical studies, however, did not provide strong evidence to 
support the hypothesis. For instance, studies have considered competition from other schools, 
including public and private, as one of the monitoring mechanisms for schools to maximize 
educational outcomes (Grosskopf, et al., 2001; Kang & Greene, 2002; Ruggiero, et al., 1995). 
The results of the studies were mixed. Ruggiero and colleagues (1995) found that the presence of 
competition was associated with greater inefficiency in New York State; but other studies (Kang 
& Greene, 2002; Grosskopf, et al, 2001) indicated that competition had no significant impact on 
inefficiency.  
Currently, with the development of standards-based reform movement in K-12 education in 
the United States, more and more emphasis is put on developing and implementing school 
accountability policies. In particular, the NCLB act implemented in 2001 lays out specific goals, 
requirements, as well as sanctions and rewards for schools to improve student achievement in the 
whole nation.  
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The main goal of NCLB is to make every student in public schools proficient in math and 
reading by the 2013-2014 school year. Under the policy, states are required to set proficiency 
targets for each year, to test all students annually in grades 3 through 8 in math and reading, and 
to report to the public student performances on the tests. Test scores are reported in several 
performance levels, determined by individual state, and disaggregated by race, gender, special 
education, English-language proficiency, and socio-economic status. To accomplish the goal of 
having every student proficient by 2014, schools need to make adequate yearly progress (AYP). 
Schools that do not make AYP for the first year will receive additional assistance, but face 
sanctions after two or more years of failing to make AYP. Sanctions include providing free 
tutoring services to students, allowing students to transfer to another school, implementing a 
corrective action plan, and/or restructuring school.  
Thus, it is expected that NCLB, the currently most widely implemented accountability 
policy in the country, will serve as a monitoring mechanism and provide strong incentives for 
schools to maximize their productive activities and subsequently to improve their technical 
efficiency level. 
 
The Problem 
 Many studies have been conducted to examine the impacts of NCLB on public schools from 
different angles since its passage. Some have investigated whether student achievement has 
improved under NCLB (Center on Education Policy, 2005, 2007; Choi, Seltzer, Herman, & 
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Yamashiro, 2007; Cohen, Murray, & Clewell, 2007; Gribben, Campbell, Mathew, 2008; Miura, 
2008; Hoerandner & Lemke, 2005; Mueller & Schmitt, 2006), while others are concerned if 
NCLB has had impacts on teaching practices (D’Amico, 2008; McMurrer, 2008; Opfer, Henry, 
& Mashburn, 2008; Russell, 2008). Still others have investigated whether NCLB has propelled 
schools to put more effort on improving students on the margin of becoming proficient while 
ignoring those at the highest- and lowest-end (Chakrabarti, 2006; Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Krieg, 
2008; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2007; Reback, 2008; Springer, 2008).  
Among empirical research on the impacts of NCLB, however, few studies investigate the 
effect of NCLB on school technical efficiency, defined as the distance between observed outputs 
schools produced and maximum outputs they are able to produce. Primont and Domazlicky 
(2006) conducted the only study so far to examine the impact of NCLB on school technical 
efficiency. The authors used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate technical efficiency 
of schools districts in Missouri in 2002. They found that the average inefficiency level in 
Missouri was 22.5%, suggesting that school districts should have produced 22.5% more 
outcomes if they operated at efficient level. In addition, they found that school districts that 
failed to make AYP were substantially less efficient than passing ones. However, this study only 
estimated one year’s performance, and this was the first year when NCLB was implemented. It is 
very likely that the policy has lagged effects which will take time to manifest. Moreover, in the 
study the effect of NCLB was analyzed by utilizing simulated data at the district level, which 
may not capture the impact NCLB has actually had on school level technical efficiency.  
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It is important to examine the influence of NCLB on school technical efficiency for several 
reasons. First, estimating schools’ technical efficiency can be useful to more accurately evaluate 
schools’ performance. Under NCLB and other test-based accountability policies, schools are 
currently evaluated and ranked according to whether they reach a designated benchmark, which 
in the case of NCLB is the percentage of students proficient in state assessments, without 
considering how many inputs are used to achieve the output. Such a method of evaluation is 
output-based and effectiveness-focused, for it only indicates whether schools are effective in 
producing the outcome - proficient students. It does not provide information on how well schools 
utilize their resources during the process of producing the outcomes. It is very likely that 
effective schools, the ones that made AYP, were inefficient in using the resources while some 
ineffective ones already used their resources to the maximal level. Therefore, evaluating schools 
using their technical efficiency level not only shows a better picture of the production process, 
but also has implications for allocating resources among schools. 
Second, it is critical to estimate school technical efficiency because of budget shortfalls in 
education. The current financial crisis leads to substantial spending cuts in many state services 
which include K-12 education by state governments (McNichol & Lav, 2008). Therefore, schools 
have to use the inputs more wisely so that they can achieve more proficient students and make 
AYP as required by NCLB. The knowledge about the past and current efficiency levels can be 
valuable for school administrators and policy makers to improve school performance. 
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Finally, examining the issue of the effect of NCLB on school technical efficiency can 
contribute to developing a better theory of inefficiency in education. As discussed, few empirical 
studies have been conducted to investigate the determinants of inefficiency in education, and 
among existing studies no strong evidence has been found to support the theories of inefficiency. 
Using NCLB as a monitoring mechanism on the behaviors of school administrators and teachers, 
we can gain some insight as to whether NCLB provides incentives for them to maximize their 
productive activities and in turn to produce more proficient students. 
 
The Purpose 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the effect of NCLB on school 
efficiency in three states, Indiana, Minnesota, and South Carolina. These three states are chosen 
as the subjects of investigation because of their availability of test scores in pre-NCLB years, 
which enables us to compare the pre-NCLB to post-NCLB changes in school efficiency. This 
dissertation employs two-stage analysis to address the issue. The first-stage analysis is to 
estimate school efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The outputs for the 
first-stage DEA models are percentages of students in three proficiency levels in each tested 
subject as required by NCLB. The inputs of the first-stage DEA models are per pupil expenditure 
and three students demographic characteristics, including those who are not eligible for free- and 
reduced-price lunch program, not minority, and not Limited English proficiency.  
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At the second stage, a difference-in-differences estimator, which can rule out unobserved 
influences other than NCLB, is used to examine the effect of NCLB on school efficiency. The 
difference-in-differences estimator is constructed by classifying schools into two groups: 
unthreatened and threatened, based on their pre-NCLB test scores. The effect of NCLB is then 
captured by the difference between two groups of schools in terms of their pre-NCLB to 
post-NCLB changes in efficiency.  
This dissertation hypothesizes that NCLB has helped schools, especially those at risk of not 
making AYP, to raise their efficiency. Specifically, we ask the following research questions: 
1. Has school efficiency changed over time? 
Subsidiary questions: 
1a. Have public schools in Indiana, Minnesota, and South Carolina improved efficiency 
over time? 
1b. Have different types of schools in three states had different efficiency levels? 
2. Has NCLB influenced the change of school efficiency over time? 
 
Outline 
This dissertation is constructed as follows. Chapter two reviews the empirical studies on the 
effects of NCLB on public schools and those on technical efficiency in K-12 education in the 
United States. The first part of chapter two analyzes the effects of NCLB on (1) student test 
scores, and (2) teachers’ strategic instruction. The second part of the chapter examines (1) the 
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methods used to measure technical efficiency in K-12 education, (2) the measures of technical 
efficiency in education, and (3) the determinants of inefficiency in education. The third part of 
the chapter reviews studies that investigated the effect of NCLB on technical efficiency, followed 
by the final part that summarizes the findings. 
Chapter three discusses the methodology of conducting analysis. It begins by presenting the 
concept of economic efficiency and the method of measuring efficiency in this dissertation. The 
second part of this chapter defines the outputs used at the first stage analysis, followed by the 
discussion of model specification in the third part. Strategies of handling the threats to validity 
are presented in the fourth part. The final part of chapter three discusses the data used to conduct 
the analysis. 
Chapter four presents the results. This dissertation is ended with chapter five which 
discusses the findings, policy implications, the limitations of the study, as well as the 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Effects of NCLB on Public Schools 
 Many empirical studies have been conducted to examine the influence of NCLB on public 
schools since its passage into law. Generally, the majority of studies focus on two broad areas: 
student achievement and teachers and principals’ behavior. Overall the average student test 
scores are consistently found to increase after the introduction of NCLB. However, different 
groups of student have experienced distinct rates of improvement. Furthermore, some scholars 
have argued that the increased student test scores are not the result of the improvement of real 
learning; rather they are caused by teachers’ strategic instruction. In the following sections, I 
review the studies on these areas separately. 
 
NCLB and Student Achievement 
 The center of the debate with respect to the effects of NCLB is whether the policy has 
positive impacts on student achievement. Studies have consistently shown that average student 
test scores have increased since NCLB was implemented (Center on Education Policy (CEP), 
2007; Choi, Seltzer, Herman, & Yamashiro, 2007; Cronin, et al., 2005; Gribben, Campbell, 
Mathew, 2008; Mueller & Schmitt, 2006).  
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Using national data, the Center on Education Policy (CEP) examined the trends in state test 
scores since NCLB was enacted (CEP, 2007). Their study showed that math and reading scores 
have increased since the policy was implemented. In addition, among 13 states which have 
sufficient data to make the comparison before and after NCLB, nine states showed that average 
annual gains in two subjects’ test scores have been greater in post-NCLB years than in 
pre-NCLB years. Another study that examined national trends in achievement (Cronin, et al., 
2005) reached a similar conclusion that student test scores in reading and math have improved in 
the post-NCLB era. 
 Furthermore, the study by Mueller and Schmitt (2006) also found evidence that student 
achievement has increased under NCLB. Using Kansas data from 2000 - 2005, the authors 
examined effects of AYP requirement on student achievement by calculating effect sizes of the 
change in proportion of students in different achievement levels before and after NCLB. They 
found that effect sizes were large when comparing results two years before NCLB with three 
years after NCLB, suggesting that student achievement gains were higher in post-NCLB than in 
pre-NCLB years. 
 Although there is evidence of improvement in average student achievement since NCLB 
was implemented, the effects of the policy are not identical for different student groups. 
Generally, there are two types of achievement gaps that researchers are interested in. The first is 
the achievement gap among different racial groups, usually between black/Hispanic and 
white/Asian students. Studies indicated that different racial groups experienced different rates of 
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improvement in achievement, resulting in gaps as great as or greater than in the past. Lee (2006) 
examined national reading and math achievement trends using NAEP data. The author found that 
although the achievement gap between black and white students in math narrowed to some 
extent immediately after NCLB was enacted, the narrowing did not persist. Furthermore, the gap 
in reading did not decline under NCLB. Another study even found that the gap in the percentage 
of students in the top performance level between black/Hispanic and white students widened 
over time (Gibben, et al., 2008), using states’ assessment results. 
 The second is the achievement gap among students with different levels of ability. The 
minimum proficiency requirement of NCLB gives schools strong incentives to target resources 
to students at the margin of becoming proficient and ignore those at the high- and low-end of the 
achievement distribution. There is mixed evidence on this issue.  
Several studies indicated that the improvement of low-achieving students was realized at the 
expense of high-achieving peers (Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Reback, 2008; Neal & Schanzenbach, 
2007; Krieg, 2008). Using Texas data from 1992-93 to 1997-98 school year, Reback (2008) 
examined the impacts of the incentives from the school accountability system on the distribution 
of student achievement among different ability groups of students. The author found that 
low-achieving students experienced larger than expected gains in achievement, but 
high-achieving students had lower gains if their test scores were irrelevant to school’s rating. 
Moreover, Krieg (2008) found that in Washington high-performing students had less than 
expected gains in achievement in schools that did not make AYP, suggesting that schools facing 
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the threats of sanctions under NCLB ignored the high-performing students and that more 
resources were devoted toward those with a high probability of being proficient. 
However, other studies reached a different conclusion: that the improvement of 
low-achieving students was accomplished without hurting that of high-achieving counterparts 
(Chakrabarti, 2006; Mullier, & Schmitt, 2006; Springer, 2008). Chakrabarti (2006) examined the 
impacts of Florida school accountability on public schools. She found that schools that faced 
threats of vouchers did put more emphasis on improving the achievement for students below the 
minimum proficiency cutoffs. However, the improvement was not to the detriment of 
high-performing students. Similarly, Springer (2008) found that both low- and high-performing 
students experienced larger gains in test scores in non-AYP schools than their corresponding 
peers in AYP schools, suggesting that the improvement of low-achieving students did not hurt 
high-performing students. 
 
NCLB and Teachers’ Strategic Instructions 
 Although the overall test scores have increased since the accountability policy was 
introduced, some scholars argued that the rise of test scores might not be the result of the 
improvement of real learning (Jacob, 2005; Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey, & Stecher, 2000; 
Koretz, 2008). Rather, it is claimed that strategic behavior exhibited by teachers and school 
leaders was the reason for the inflation of test scores. Specifically, two behaviors are considered 
in the literature. First, the increase of test scores is believed to be the result of teachers spending 
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more time on high-stakes subjects. Studies that examined pre-NCLB school accountability found 
evidence that teachers indeed spent more time on high-stakes subjects, such as math and reading 
(Deere & Strayer 2001; Koretz & Barron, 1998; Stecher, 2002). Moreover, among high-stakes 
subjects, teachers were more likely to focus on the one that was relatively easier to improve, such 
as writing in the case of Florida, in order to improve their school’s rating and avoid sanctions 
(Chakrabarti, 2006; Goldhaber & Hannaway, 2004). Additionally, researchers in CEP also 
showed that teachers spent more time on high-stakes subjects, i.e. reading/English and math, 
while reducing instructional time on other low-stakes subjects, such as science, social studies, 
and the arts, since NCLB was launched (CEP, 2007). 
Second, it is believed that the inflation of test scores is due to the exclusion of low-achieving 
students from testing pools. There is mixed evidence on this argument. Some studies indicated 
that more students were classified into special education after school accountability systems were 
introduced (Cullen & Reback, 2002; Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Jacob, 2005; Mintrop, 2003). 
However, other studies showed that there was no evidence to suggest schools displayed gaming 
behavior by classifying more students into special education category (Chakrabarti, 2006). Since 
NCLB requires at least 95% of students should participate in state assessments, otherwise 
schools will be considered as not making AYP, it is expected that schools have little opportunity 
to exclude low-performing students from taking the tests. 
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Technical Efficiency in Education 
 A majority of studies on technical efficiency in education have emphasized how to measure 
technical efficiency per se, without considering the sources of inefficiency. Thus, much attention 
has been paid to the methods of measuring technical efficiency in education. In the following 
sections, I review the methods of measuring, the results of measured technical efficiency, and the 
determinants of inefficiency, respectively. 
 
Methods of Measurements 
Generally, two approaches are adopted to estimate technical efficiency in different settings: 
one is parametric and the other non-parametric. Both approaches have their disadvantages and 
advantages. Thus, which approach to use is a source of debate in the literature. However, there is 
mixed evidence on this question. Some researchers stated that the choice of approaches affected 
the empirical estimation (Cummins & Zi, 1998; Ferrier & Lovell, 1990), while other showed that 
both approaches yielded similar ranking of efficiency scores (Chakraborty, et al., 2001; Forsund, 
1992; Murillo-Zamorano & Vega-Cervera, 2001). 
In educational settings, several studies have compared two approaches (Bifulco & 
Bretschneider, 2001; Chakraborty, et al., 2001; Sengupta & Sfeir, 1986). Bifulco and 
Bretschneider (2001) simulated 12 datasets, with different assumptions on measurement errors, 
sample sizes, and correlations between error terms and inputs, to compare corrected ordinary 
least square (COLS) with Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). They found that if there are no 
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measurement errors or no correlations between error terms and inputs in the data, both methods 
perform well, in particular COLS, as the estimated efficiency is close to the true efficiency. 
However, when it is assumed there are measurement errors that are correlated with inputs, as is 
common in educational data, efficiency measures from both approaches deviate substantially 
from true efficiency. Under this circumstance, COLS slightly outperformed DEA when sample 
sizes were bigger.  
Another study (Chakraborty, et al., 2001) empirically measured the efficiency level of school 
districts in Utah using both stochastic frontier analysis and DEA. The authors found two 
approaches yield similar rankings of school districts in terms of efficiency measures, suggesting 
that choosing either method will not substantially influence the empirical results. 
 
Measures of Technical Efficiency in Education 
Despite the fact that the estimation methods vary from studies to studies, researchers have 
generally reached the same conclusion, that public schools (or school districts) are fairly 
inefficient in producing desirable educational outcomes (Bessent, et al., 1982; Chakraborty, et al., 
2001; Grosskopf, et al., 1997; Noulas & Ketkar, 1998). For instance, Grosskopf and colleagues 
(1997) found that the average efficiency level, estimated by using indirect output distance 
function, is .71 for school districts in Texas, implying that school districts should be able to 
produce almost 30% more output if they operated efficiently. Another study (Chakraborty, et al., 
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2001) also showed that the average technical efficiency for school districts in Utah is .86, 
estimated by using stochastic frontier analysis.  
However, some studies concluded that at the elementary level, schools or school districts 
operated at efficient level (Deller & Rudnicki, 1993; Anderson, Walberg, & Weinstein, 1998; 
Chalos, 1997). For instance, Anderson and colleagues (1998) concluded that elementary schools 
in Chicago were relatively efficient in producing student achievement. Similarly, Deller and 
Rudnicki (1993) and Chalos (1997) indicated that the average technical efficiency was .91 for 
elementary schools in Maine and Illinois, considered to be fairly efficient in educational settings,  
 
Determinants of Technical Inefficiency in Education 
Although inefficient production in education is acknowledged, no conclusive evidence is 
available to explain the sources of inefficiency. Generally, two arguments are offered in the 
literature to identify the determinants of inefficiency. The first argument follows the education 
production function literature in noting that family backgrounds and community characteristics 
play a more important role in student achievement than school inputs. Inefficiencies in schools 
are therefore due to the severity of the environment they face, such as having more at-risk 
students from less favorable socio-economic environments. However, there is disagreement 
among researchers with respect to the ways of handling non-discretionary environmental factors. 
One group of researchers favors a single-stage approach in which environmental variables are 
included in the production frontier models along with discretionary inputs (Bessent, et al, 1982; 
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Chalos, 1997; Cooper & Cohen, 1997; Deller & Rudnicki, 1993). However, the single-stage 
approach assumes environmental factors are endogenous and discretionary by incorporating 
them in the frontier models, which is not the case in reality. 
Therefore, researchers also separate exogenous environmental factors from discretionary 
inputs in a widely used two-stage approach in which estimated efficiency scores obtained from 
first stage are regressed on non-discretionary factors in a second stage (Chakraborty, et al., 2001; 
Kang & Greene, 2002; Noulas & Ketkar, 1998; Ray, 1991). For instance, Noulas and Ketkar 
(1998) adopted a two-stage analysis to investigate the impact of environmental factors on school 
districts’ efficiency level in New Jersey. They used DEA to estimate district level efficiency.  
The predicted efficiency measures were then regressed on several environmental factors, 
including median value of homes, crime rate, proportions of population below poverty, and 
proportions of minority students in the districts. They found that all environmental factors have 
significant influence on school districts’ efficiency level, with median home value having a 
positive impact on efficiency and the other three factors a negative impact. Nevertheless, 
single-stage and two-stage approaches do not give substantially different ranking of efficiency; 
the efficiency level estimated from the single-stage method is highly correlated to that adjusted 
for the influence of environmental factors from the two-stage approach (McCarty & Yaisawarng, 
1993).  
 The second argument explains the source of inefficiency in education from the viewpoint of 
the principal-agent theory, which postulates that individuals do not always behave in a 
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maximizing manner in their productive activities; instead, they tend to make compromises 
between their personal motives and the goals of the firm, which results in the deviation from the 
frontier (Leibenstein, 1978; Niskanen, 1968, 1971). In other words, inefficiency in public 
education is hypothesized to be caused by lack of incentives and/or monitoring mechanisms in 
the system (Arrow, 1985; Downes, 1996). Empirically researchers tend to operationalize the 
incentives and monitoring mechanisms into following categories: (1) competition from other 
public schools or private schools, which is expected to motivate schools to maximize their 
productivity and subsequently improve technical efficiency (Grosskopf, et al., 2001; Kang & 
Greene, 2002; Ruggiero, et al., 1995), (2) the socio-economic status of the community, including 
the shares of homeowners and households with school age children, as such households tend to 
improve efficiency by monitoring school performance (Grosskopf, et al., 2001; Kang & Greene, 
2002; Ruggiero, et al., 1995), (3) size of school districts, which is expected to be positively 
correlated with inefficiency as bigger bureaucracies introduce more inefficiency (Ruggiero, et al., 
1995), and (4) internal characteristics of schools or school districts such as the proportion of 
tenured teachers, given that tenured teachers are expected not to perform to their maximal 
productivity level (Ruggiero, et al., 1995).  
Nonetheless, empirical studies do not find strong evidence to support these hypotheses. Take 
competition for example. Ruggiero and colleagues (1995) found that the presence of competition 
was associated with greater inefficiency in New York State; but other studies (Kang & Greene, 
2002; Grosskopf, et al, 2001) indicated that competition had no significant impact on inefficiency. 
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Additionally, higher socio-economic status of the community was found to be associated with 
greater inefficiency, while school district size was negatively correlated with inefficiency 
(Ruggiero, et al., 1995), which contradicts with the predictions of the inefficiency theory. Only 
teacher tenure had the expected positive relationship with inefficiency (Ruggiero, et al., 1995). 
 
Impacts of NCLB on Technical Efficiency in Education 
 As discussed, few studies have investigated the impacts of NCLB or other test-based 
accountability policies on how efficiently schools produce educational outcomes. The study by 
Primont and Domazlicky (2006) is thus far the only one that examined the question. The authors 
used DEA to estimate the efficiency level for school districts in Missouri in 2002. They found 
that the average inefficiency level for school districts was 22.5%, suggesting that school districts 
would have produced 22.5% more output if they operated at the efficient level. Moreover, the 
authors indicated that school districts that failed to make AYP were substantially less efficient 
than the ones that made AYP. Additionally, the authors simulated the effects of two sanctions of 
NCLB, providing tutoring services and transferring students from failing schools to passing ones, 
on the performance of failing school districts. They found that the diversion of resources to these 
functions made failing schools more inefficient.  
However, this study has several limitations. First, it is a cross-sectional analysis; thus it is 
unclear about the change of efficiency over time. Second, the findings were based on simulated 
data, which did not capture the real impacts of sanctions from NCLB. Since the data used in this 
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study were from the first year of NCLB (i.e. 2002), in which the effects of the policy were not 
yet manifested, actual changes in student achievement were not taken into account. Third, the 
analyses were at the district level; therefore, the findings may not fully reflect the impacts of 
NCLB on school level efficiency. 
 
Why Further Research is Needed 
 As discussed in the previous sections, most empirical studies that examined the influence of 
NCLB on public schools have focused on student achievement. Those studies have two 
limitations. First, they have only emphasized outputs without taking into consideration inputs. 
This type of output-only research has resulted to some extent in bias in assessing schools’ 
performance as the same output can be produced using less input in some schools than in others. 
Second, although many studies have indicated that average student test scores were higher in 
post-NCLB years compared to pre-NCLB years, it is unclear whether the improvement of test 
scores can be attributed to the policy. The reason is that the current studies used simple pre- to 
post-NCLB comparison (CEP, 2007; Mueller & Schmitt, 2006), which did not control for other 
possibilities, such as changes in test difficulty or in student and teacher familiarity with tests, or 
in other accountability policies implemented over the same period. 
 Furthermore, the literature on technical efficiency in education does not provide adequate 
evidence on the determinants of inefficiency. Although it is proposed in the literature that lack of 
incentives and monitoring mechanisms is the source of inefficiency in education, empirical 
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studies have not find strong support for this hypothesis. Nowadays, NCLB is an accountability 
policy that influences almost all public schools in the nation. However, few studies have 
examined whether NCLB and its associated incentives have influenced technical efficiency in 
schools. 
 Therefore, this dissertation fills the gap in the literature by investigating the impact of NCLB 
on school efficiency. NCLB requires that schools reach Annual Measurable Objectives (AMO), 
as set by individual states, to make AYP and thus avoid sanctions. With state budgets shrinking 
(McNichol & Lav, 2008), schools have to use their resources more wisely so that more output (in 
this case, the percentage of proficient students) can be produced. Thus, this dissertation 
hypothesizes that the threats of facing sanctions under NCLB will work as an incentive for 
schools to improve their efficiency. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The Production Frontier and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 The idea of economic efficiency was introduced as early as the 1950s by Koopmans (1951), 
Debreu (1951), and Farrell (1957). Generally, technical efficiency is defined as the situation in 
which it is impossible to increase one output of a decision-making unit (DMU) without 
increasing its inputs or reducing one or more of its other outputs (Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2004). 
Schools that produce less than they could, given their production frontier, are deemed inefficient. 
There are two broad approaches to the estimation of the production frontier and technical 
efficiency, parametric and non-parametric. The parametric approach, of which stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) is the most widely used, assumes specific functional forms for technology and for 
inefficiency, which causes problems related to model specification and estimation. The 
non-parametric approach is represented by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA does not 
impose any functional form, which makes it possible to disclose relationships that are unseen by 
other approaches. Furthermore, DEA can easily accommodate multiple outputs and inputs.  
Which approach to use is a source of debate in the literature. However, no decisive evidence 
is offered with respect to the question which method more accurately measures technical 
efficiency. Stochastic frontier analysis has been conducted in the literature, but our preliminary 
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analysis was unsuccessful because of the orientation of the data distribution. Minnesota, one of 
the states that will be analyzed in this dissertation, can be taken as an example. There are two 
outputs: the percentage of students at the proficient level or higher (Y1), and the percentage of 
advanced students (Y2)
1
. Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of these two outputs, holding constant 
the level of inputs, using Minnesota data. Y1 and Y2 are positively associated. However, 
stochastic frontier analysis assumes a negative relationship between two outputs. Consequently, 
it is inappropriate to use this method to conduct the analysis.  
 
 
Figure 1, Scatter Plot of Y1 and Y2, Minnesota 
 
                                                 
1 The reason of constructing these two measures of outputs will be explained in more details in later sections. They are 
mentioned here only to illustrate the distribution of the data. 
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Unlike stochastic frontier analysis, DEA assumes no functional form for production and for 
inefficiency, which makes it possible to unveil the unseen relationship, such as the one in this 
case. Additionally, DEA’s advantages in easily handling multiple outputs and inputs make it a 
better choice for conducting efficiency analysis in the education sector. Thus, this study uses 
DEA to estimate efficiency in schools. 
DEA was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978, 1981). The basic 
output-oriented CCR model, assuming constant returns to scale (CRS), determines technical 
efficiency for individual DMU i that uses a set of inputs ),...,,( 21 kiiii xxxX  to produce a vector 
of outputs ),...,,( 21 miiii yyyY   by using the following linear programming problem: 
 ,
Max   
Subject to  tnntt yyy   ...2211    tiy , t = 1, 2, …, m 
snnss xxx   ...2211    six , s = 1, 2, …, k 
        ,1  2 , …, n    0              (1) 
in which n is the numbers of DUMs, m the numbers of outputs, k the numbers of inputs, and ,1  
2 , …, n  are non-negative weights assigned to inputs and outputs. Problem (1) asks, given the 
same or lower input level, how much more output a DMU can produce and still remain within 
the production possibility set, as determined by the outputs and inputs of other DMUs as well as 
itself. Technical efficiency is the reciprocal of , whose value ranges from 0 to 1. A value of 1 
means the DMU operates efficiently, less than 1 that it is inefficient. For instance, if   equals 
1.5, the DMU can produce 1.5 times as much of each output without using more inputs. Thus, 
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the technical efficiency of the DMU is 1/1.5 = .67. This linear programming problem is then 
solved n times (because there are n DMUs), yielding efficiency estimates for all DMUs. 
 Let us consider a simple example where there are 5 DMUs (A, B, C, D, and E) and they use 
one input (x) to produce two outputs (y1, y2). The example can be illustrated in Figure 2. As 
indicated, the frontier is constructed as the piecewise linear combination of efficient DMUs, A, B, 
and E. Relative to A, B, and E, C and D are inefficient and lie within the frontier line.  
 
 
Figure 2, Output-Oriented Efficiency and Slack 
 
If we radially extend C until it reaches the frontier line, we can obtain point C*. C* is 
considered to be the efficient point for C, meaning that the DMU can expand its y2 and y1 to C* 
without using more x. Therefore,   equals the ratio OC*/OC. The efficiency for C is the 
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reciprocal of , that is, OC/OC*. Additionally, C* lies between A and E, indicating that DMU’s A 
and E are the reference group for C. 
 Similarly, D is inefficient and its y2 and y1 can be radially expanded to point  D. Thus, the 
efficiency of DMU D is the ratio OD/O D. However,  D is not a truly efficient point for D. 
Compared to  D, given the same x B has the same amount of y2 but more y1, suggesting that D 
can further expand its output of y1 without increasing x. Consequently, B is the truly efficient 
point for D. The distance between  D (weak efficiency) and B (true efficiency) is called output 
slack (slack = B -  D). 
 Many DEA models assume constant returns to scale (CRS). However, this assumption can 
produce misleading measures of efficiency if returns to scale are variable and some schools are 
operating at suboptimal scales, for the effect of scale can then be confounded with inefficiency
2
 
(Coelli, Rao, O’Donnell, & Battese, 2005). To take this possibility into account, this study 
employs a DEA model assuming variable returns to scale (VRS). As a result, problem (1) is 
modified slightly into the following linear programming problem: 
 ,
Max   
Subject to  tnntt yyy   ...2211    tiy , t = 1, 2, …, m 
snnss xxx   ...2211    six , s = 1, 2, …, k 
       
n
i
1
  = 1                 (2) 
                                                 
2 If not all DMUs operate at the optimal scale, technical efficiency estimated from DEA models that assume CRS will be 
confounded with scale efficiencies. Models that assume VRS can solve this problem. The difference between CRS and VRS 
models is explained in more detail in the appendix. 
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Note that the constraint of 
n
i
1
  = 1 in problem (2) ensures that DMUi is compared with other 
DMUs of a similar size.  
 
Defining Outputs given Characteristics of NCLB Data 
 It is a common practice in education research to treat student achievement in standardized 
tests as the measure of educational outputs. We follow that tradition. However, unlike other 
research that uses student-level achievement or school/district average scores as outputs, our 
study defines outputs based on the percentage of students at various performance levels. Under 
NCLB, schools generally report student test scores in three broad levels: below proficient, 
proficient, and advanced
3
. Given that these three outcomes add up to one hundred percent, one is 
redundant and can be dropped. We drop the middle group, the percent proficient. 
  The reason for dropping the percent proficient as an output is that the other two outputs, 
percent advanced and percent below proficient, will show the tradeoffs among three proficiency 
levels. As required by NCLB, the percentage of proficient students is one of the most important 
determinants of schools’ AYP status. The percentage of proficient students can be increased by 
two ways: moving students either from below proficient up to proficient, or from advanced down 
to proficient. The movements of students from the top and the bottom level toward the middle 
level imply two different responses of schools toward the provisions of NCLB. First, by 
                                                 
3 Some states report test scores in four (below basic, basic, proficient, and advanced) or five performance levels (below basic, 
basic, proficient, advanced, and advanced plus). Still, the performance levels can be classified into three groups: not proficient, 
proficient, and above proficient. Therefore, we consider there are three broad performance levels. 
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providing high quality instruction and other effective strategies schools will try to improve the 
achievement for low performing students and help them reach higher levels, which is consistent 
with the ultimate goals of the policy. On the other hand, it is possible that schools, in particular 
those with a large proportion of low performing students, will be so eager to increase the 
percentage of proficient students that they will sacrifice the number of students in the advanced 
group (Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Reback, 2008). 
Unfortunately, empirical studies have not found suggestive evidence on whether schools 
trade off advanced students for those at lower proficiency levels (Chakrabarti, 2006; Krieg, 2008; 
Neal & Schanzenbach, 2007; Reback, 2008; Springer, 2008). Using the top and the bottom 
proficiency levels as two outputs will shed some light on the possible tradeoffs among three 
proficiency levels. However, the percent below proficient should not be regarded as an output in 
the conventional sense, as no school wants to produce more of these students. Thus it is 
necessary to make some adjustment to the percent below proficient so that it becomes a positive, 
desirable output. The adjustment is made by subtracting the percent below proficient from 100.  
The result equals the total of percent proficient and percent advanced. As a result, the two 
outputs used at the first stage models are the percent advanced (ADV) and the total of the percent 
proficient and the percent advanced (PRF+ADV). 
As shown in Figure 3, these measures of output define a meaningful efficiency frontier. If a 
school moves from point E to point A, it reduces its share of advanced students but increases the 
total of proficient and advanced students—thus the reduction in advanced students occurs at the 
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same time as an increase in the overall percentage that are proficient or above – a plausible 
trade-off. For such a school, the increase of (PRF+ADV) implies that students have moved out of 
the bottom category. In a school that is operating efficiently, this can only occur if something else 
is given up, in this case, the percentage of students in the top category.  
 
 
Figure 3, The Production Frontier using ADV and (PRF+ADV) as Outputs 
 
 If a school simply produces fewer advanced students (they drop down to the proficient level) 
without also reducing the proportion of students below proficient, ADV declines while 
(PRF+ADV) is unchanged. Such a school becomes less efficient, moving from a point such as E 
on the frontier to C within the frontier.  
As far as inefficient schools are concerned, there are three possible movements toward the 
frontier line, which is illustrated in Figure 4. The first possible movement is to increase ADV 
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without changing (PRF+ADV), implying students are moved from proficient to advanced level. 
The second possible movement is to increase (PRF+ADV) without changing ADV, suggesting 
students are moved from below proficient to proficient. The third possible movement is to 
increase ADV and (PRF+ADV) simultaneously, meaning students are moved from the bottom 
category to proficient or from proficient to advanced.  
 
 
Figure 4, Possible Movements for Inefficient Schools 
 
Consequently, it is possible to tell the movement of students among three performance levels 
by looking at the path taken by an individual school across time. In addition, this path reveals 
whether there are tradeoffs among low-, average- and high-achieving students. 
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Model Specifications 
First-Stage Models 
Technical efficiency is measured at the first-stage analysis using DEA. When it comes to 
specifying DEA models, three issues need to be considered: first, to what extent the production 
of math and reading outcomes should be treated as independent or as substitutes for one another; 
second, the possibility that schools in different locations have substantially different production 
processes; and third, the assumption that technology in education does not change greatly over a 
short period of time. 
It is uncertain to what extent the production of math and reading outcomes should be treated 
as independent or as substitutes for one another. In the elementary level they are more apt to be 
substitutes, as both subjects tend to be taught in the same classroom by the same teacher, who 
controls the allocation of time across subjects. At the middle and high school levels they are 
more likely to be independent, as instruction is departmentalized.  
To explore the issue of substitution/independence, this study begins with a restrictive model 
before relaxing the assumptions. The most restrictive model assumes there is no substitution at 
all across subjects. Each subject is produced independently in each grade. As a result, technical 
efficiency is estimated separately for each subject in each grade. We then relax this assumption to 
allow for substitution across subjects, estimating models in which reading and math achievement 
appear as joint outputs. In addition, it is assumed that there is no substitution across grades. 
Therefore, the DEA models are run separately by grades. 
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The second issue to be considered is the possibility that schools in different locations have 
substantially different characteristics which result in different production processes. Schools in 
rural areas tend to be smaller and contain more grades than those in urban area. In addition, 
urban and suburban schools are more likely than rural schools to have highly-qualified teachers 
(Ballou & Podgursky, 1998). Thus, it is expected that schools in urban and rural area face distinct 
process of producing educational outputs. To take into account this possibility the DEA models 
are run separately by location. 
Finally, technology in education seems not to change substantially over a short period of 
time. In sectors like agriculture, technology changes often and quickly, pushing outward the 
production frontier. However, in educational settings, usually technology does not change 
dramatically over a short period of time, which results in a relatively constant production frontier. 
Consequently, the sample is pooled over all years. 
To summarize, four DEA models are constructed based on different pairs of outputs. One 
uses ADV and (PRF+ADV) in math as outputs, one ADV and (PRF+ADV) in reading, one 
(PRF+ADV) in both math and reading, and one ADV and (PRF+ADV) in both math and 
reading
4
. These four models are estimated separately by grade and by location (urban or rural).  
Our analysis does not investigate the allocation of resources within schools directly, e.g., 
how many computers and books schools possess, what degrees teachers hold, and how big 
classes are. All such decisions remain inside a black-box model of production that treats 
                                                 
4 In states that tested more than math and reading, such as South Carolina, the numbers of DEA models constructed will equal 
numbers of tested subjects+1. 
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outcomes as a function of the level of schools’ non-discretionary inputs. The nondiscretionary 
inputs in the first-stage analysis are per-pupil expenditure (PPE), the percentage of students who 
are not eligible for free- and reduced-priced lunch program (non-FRL), the percentage that are 
not limited English proficient (non-LEP), and the percentage that are white (non-MINORITY). 
Note that an increase in any input tends to push the frontier out from the origin. 
Because of the assumption of black-box production, estimates of technical efficiency in this 
study in fact encompass both technical and allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to 
the situation in which inputs are utilized in optimal proportions, given input prices. Figure 5 
illustrates how allocative efficiency is estimated by considering a simple case which two inputs 
X1 and X2 are used, where w is the input prices. As indicated in the graph, point A* is a 
technically efficient but not allocatively efficient, because at A* the ratio of marginal 
productivity of X1 to that of X2 does not equal the ratio of price of X1 to that of X2. Given the 
prices of two inputs, a DMU (a school in this study) can gain allocative efficiency by using less 
X1 and more X2 (i.e. at point A’) during the production process, which subsequently improves 
the total efficiency for the school. 
It is very likely that NCLB may influence schools’ decisions on reallocating resources within 
schools, such as reassigning more highly qualified teachers to classrooms or grades which have 
more low-achieving students, which in turn will boost the overall efficiency level. Therefore, the 
measures of efficiency in this dissertation in fact include both technical and allocative efficiency.  
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Figure 5, Allocative Efficiency 
 
Second-Stage Models 
 In the second stage, estimated efficiency and slack from the first-stage analysis are used as 
dependent variables. A difference-in-differences approach is utilized to identify NCLB effects on 
school efficiency and on slack. Difference-in-differences is often used to detect the effect of 
policy change. Suppose there are two groups, A and B. Group A is affected by the new policy in 
the second period of time but not in the first period and group B is not affected during either 
period. The effect of the new policy can be estimated three possible ways. The first method is to 
compare group A in the second time period to itself in the first time period. However, this simple 
before-and-after comparison does not remove the bias due to the trends; it is possible that the 
change that happens in the second time period would be the natural development of group A in 
the absence of the new policy. The second method of estimating the effect of the new policy is to 
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compare group A to group B after the new policy is introduced. Nonetheless, the effect of the 
policy estimated by this method is biased in that it may be caused by the permanent difference 
between group A and B rather than the new policy itself. 
The third method is difference-in-differences estimation. This method estimates the effect of 
the new policy by subtracting group B’s change from the first to the second period from group 
A’s change. Mathematically this can be expressed as
 
)()( 1,2,1,2, BBAA yyyy  , in which y is 
the output of interest and 1 and 2 refer to the first and second time period, respectively. Since 
group B is not affected by the policy, its difference before and after the introduction of the policy 
(i.e., 1,2, BB yy  ) will illustrate what would have happened in the absence of the policy. Then by 
subtracting the change between the first and second time period for group B from that for group 
A, we can obtain the effect of the new policy. Consequently, the difference-in-differences 
estimator can control for confounding factors that are due to the trends and the permanent 
differences between two groups. Thus, it is more appropriate to be used to identify the effect of 
NCLB. 
 However, NCLB is a policy that applies to all public schools in the whole nation, making it 
impossible to distinguish a real control group of schools. Nonetheless, not every school responds 
to NCLB’s sanctions in the same way. Schools with high student test scores may not have the 
same reactions to NCLB as the ones with low test scores. Therefore, it is possible to construct a 
pseudo-treatment and pseudo-control group based on schools’ pre-NCLB test performances. 
Schools with high pre-NCLB test scores do not have incentives to improve their efficiency since 
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they already make AYP and face little or no threat of sanctions. They are termed unthreatened 
schools and treated as a control group. By contrast, schools with a non-negligible probability of 
failing to make AYP have stronger incentives to improve their efficiency in order to avoid 
sanctions. These are the threatened schools and considered as the treatment group.  
Since unthreatened schools are assumed not to change their behavior, our estimate of NCLB 
effects is a difference-in-differences estimator: pre-NCLB to post-NCLB changes in the 
performance of threatened schools, less the same change in the performance of unthreatened 
schools. A school fixed effect is included so that these are within-school changes. To the extent 
that even unthreatened schools have responded to NCLB, our estimates will fail to capture the 
full effects of the policy. However, given the sharp difference in incentives faced by the two sets 
of schools, we believe that our measures will capture an important part of those effects. 
Test scores from a pre-NCLB year, when schools were not influenced by NCLB yet, are 
used to define unthreatened and threatened schools. I calculate the percentage of students who 
would have been proficient had NCLB been in effect and construct a 90% confidence interval for 
that percentage for each subgroup in each tested grade in each school.
5
 Next, the minimum of 
the lower bounds of these intervals is compared to state proficiency target as established in the 
first year of NCLB. If this minimum exceeds the target (known as the Annual Measurable 
                                                 
5 We also calculate the confidence interval at 95%. The preliminary results suggest that two measures of confidence interval do 
not make final results significantly different. Thus, the final analysis uses the 90% confidence interval. 
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Objective), the school faces little threat of being sanctioned under NCLB. These schools are 
classified as unthreatened. The rest are deemed to be threatened.
6
 
In addition to the impact of NCLB on school efficiency, the second-stage analysis also 
investigates whether NCLB reduces output slack. As noted, schools may improve student 
achievement in the middle group (proficient) at the expense of high-achieving students 
(advanced). In terms of school efficiency, schools may improve their efficiency, but the output 
slack related to ADV
7
 also increases at the same time, as illustrated in Figure 6. The school 
moving from C to C’ has increased efficiency, but has more slack. Thus, investigating output 
slack can shed light on the trade-off between low- and high-performing students. As a result, 
output slack in ADV is also used as a dependent variable at the second-stage analysis to test the 
hypothesis that NCLB has influenced the tradeoff between proficient and advanced students. 
 
                                                 
6 To justify our classification of unthreatened and threatened schools, a cross-tabulation is reported in Table 1 in the appendix 
which presents the AYP status for two types of schools in Minnesota, Indiana, and South Carolina. It is shown that all 
unthreatened schools in Minnesota and Indiana made AYP, and only a very small fraction of unthreatened schools did not make 
AYP across years. Thus, our classification of unthreatened and threatened schools is reasonable. 
7 We only examine the slack in ADV. The slack in (PRF+ADV) is not practically meaningful as there are hardly any schools 
would have large percentage of advanced students but small percentage of proficient ones, except for the first stage models that 
use (PRF+ADV) in tested subjects as outputs. 
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Figure 6, Slack in ADV as the Second Measure of inefficiency 
 
 Overall, a total of ten models
8
 are analyzed at the second stage analysis. As mentioned 
earlier, four DEA models are run at the first stage analysis using different outputs. At the second 
stage, two types of school-fixed effect models are estimated using results from each DEA model 
as dependent variables: one in which the dependent variable is efficiency, the other in which it is 
slack. The ten baseline school-fixed effect models are run separately by school level (elementary 
vs. middle
9
) using same set of right-hand side regressors: a vector of year dummies, a vector of 
grade dummies, and interactions between the threatened school indicator and the year dummies. 
These models can be expressed in a more general form: 
  SCHOOLTHREATENEDYAERGRADEYEARyi *   SlackTEi ,  (3) 
                                                 
8 Again the actual numbers of second stage models for each state are determined by the numbers of DEA models that are 
estimated at the first stage (=2 times numbers of DEA models). 
9 High schools are excluded from our analysis in that high schools are tested in different tests (such as high school exit exam) 
and are hold accountable using different measurements.  
PRF+ADV 
ADV 



C 
C* 

B 
Maximum feasible ADV 
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 In the models, the grade dummies ( ) capture differences that are constant across grades, 
while a school fixed effect ( ) is included so that the changes examined are within school. Given 
the assumption that unthreatened schools do not change their behavior under NCLB, the 
coefficients on the year dummies (  ) will capture change of efficiency (or slack in ADV) for 
unthreatened schools or effects due to other confounding factors. The effect of NCLB can be 
estimated by subtracting the change of efficiency (or slack in ADV) for unthreatened schools 
from that for threatened schools. Thus, the coefficients on the interaction of the threatened school 
dummy with the year dummies ( ) will indicate the real effect of NCLB on efficiency (or slack 
in ADV). Positive coefficients during the post-2002 period from models using efficiency as the 
dependent variable will provide evidence that NCLB has led schools to improve technical 
efficiency. Positive coefficients from the models using slack as the dependent variable will 
suggest NCLB has decreased school efficiency, as improved achievement for low- and 
middle-group students has come at the expense of high-achieving students. 
A detailed summary of the models for each state that are analyzed in this dissertation is 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1, Summary of Inputs and Outputs at the First- and Second-Stage Analysis 
First -Stage  
 Outputs Inputs 
Model 1 
ADV and (PRF+ADV) in 
math 
Per-pupil expenditure (PPE), % of Non-poor students 
(NON-FRL), % of Non-minority students 
(NON-MIN), % of Non-limited English proficient 
students (NON-LEP) 
Model 2 
ADV and (PRF+ADV) in 
reading 
Model 3 
(PRF+ADV) in math & in 
reading 
Model 4 
ADV and (PRF+ADV) in 
math, and ADV and 
(PRF+ADV) in reading  
   
Second-Stage  
 Outputs Inputs 
Model 1a Efficiency in math,  
Vector of year dummies, Vector of grade dummies, 
interaction of the year dummies with threatened 
dummy, school fixed effect 
Model 1b 
Slack related to ADV in 
math 
Model 2a Efficiency in reading  
Model 2b 
Slack related to ADV in 
reading 
Model 3a 
Efficiency in math & 
reading 
Model 3b 
Slack related to 
(PRF+ADV) in math 
Model 3c 
Slack related to 
(PRF+ADV) in reading 
Model 4a 
Efficiency in math & 
reading  
Model 4b 
Slack related to ADV in 
math 
Model 4c 
Slack related to ADV in 
reading 
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Strategies of Handling Threats to Validity 
 There are several possibilities that may introduce threats to validity of the analysis in this 
dissertation, including: (a) student test scores are inflated, (b) resources in schools are diverted 
from low-stakes subjects/grades to high-stakes subjects/grades, and (c) outputs other than math 
and reading are omitted from the analysis. These issues are discussed below. 
 
Inflated Test Scores 
 As discussed previously, the outputs in this dissertation are measured by student test scores. 
However, test scores do not necessarily reflect students’ real improvement of learning (Koretz, 
1988). The rise of test scores could be the result of easier assessments or of students getting more 
familiar with the assessments. Under this circumstance, using inflated test scores as outputs will 
contribute to an overestimated efficiency. 
 The solution to this threat to validity is difference-in-differences estimation. As described 
above, a difference-in-differences estimator is constructed by classifying schools into two groups: 
unthreatened and threatened. These two types of schools are expected to have distinct responses 
toward the threat of sanctions under NCLB. However, if the state assessments get easier or 
students become more familiar with the assessments, students in both unthreatened and 
threatened schools are expected to be affected alike, with similar if not identical changes in test 
scores for both groups of schools. Thus, a change of test scores due to easier assessments or 
students’ growing familiarity with them can be controlled for by subtracting the trends of test 
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scores for unthreatened schools (i.e., control group) from those for threatened schools (i.e., 
treatment group), that is, difference-in-differences estimation. 
 
Changes in Resources 
 It is argued that one of the reasons for increased math and reading achievement is that 
schools divert resources from untested subjects like science and social studies or from untested 
grades. When facing the threats of being sanctioned, schools have strong incentives to focus 
more effort and resources on subjects and grades that are tested and held accountable under the 
requirements of NCLB. For instance, teachers may allocate more instructional time on math and 
reading while ignoring untested subjects, especially in lower grades. Or schools may assign 
better teachers to tested grades. 
 To control for the possibility that resources are extensively devoted to tested grades, this 
dissertation creates and includes in the second-stage models a new variable that measures the 
ratio of students in tested grades, or high-stakes grades, to school’s total enrollment. Note that 
Indiana and South Carolina have tested all students through third to eighth grade from the 
beginning of NCLB. Therefore, this new variable is constant and so not included in the 
second-stage models for these two states. 
 Next, the possibility that resources are drawn from other subjects can be examined by using 
a state that tests low-stakes subjects as well as high-stakes subjects. South Carolina is a good 
choice as it has administered tests in science and social studies to all students in third through 
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eighth grade from the beginning of NCLB. If schools improve math and reading achievement at 
the expense of science and social studies, estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 may show a positive 
association between NCLB and efficiency, but estimates of model in which all four subjects are 
outputs will not.  
 
Omitted Outputs 
 This dissertation focuses on two main outputs: math and reading achievement
10
. However, 
schools produce many outputs, of which math and reading achievement are only a small fraction. 
Although the South Carolina analysis will show whether estimates are sensitive to the exclusion 
of achievement in science and social studies, there are may other schooling outputs, including 
attitudes and behaviors, that are omitted from these models. As a result, it could be argued that 
this analysis does not include all relevant outputs required to determine whether schools are 
operating efficiently.   
Nevertheless, math and reading are the most fundamental subjects, especially in elementary 
grades. Students need the basic knowledge learned in math and reading in order to understand 
the materials in science and social studies. Furthermore, math and reading are especially 
important for low-achieving students, on whom NCLB is focus. In their case, it is reasonable to 
argue that math and reading are the critical school outputs and that valid measures of school 
efficiency can be obtained by focusing on those subjects. Additionally, discipline outcomes and 
                                                 
10 In the case of South Carolina, four main outputs are considered in this dissertation: math, reading, science, and social studies. 
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academic outcomes are complementary; students who perform well academically are usually 
also well-behaved in classrooms. As a result, it is more important to examine schools’ 
performance on math and reading relative to other subjects and exclusions of other outcomes 
from the analysis will not greatly affect the evaluations of schools’ performance. 
 
Data 
This study uses data from three states: Indiana, Minnesota, and South Carolina. All data are 
collected from school report cards available on state Department of Education websites. These 
three states represent different types of accountability systems under NCLB. As far as Indiana is 
concerned, students in third, sixth, eighth, and tenth grade were tested since 1998. However, in 
2002 the state introduced new content standards and modified the assessments to meet the NCLB 
accountability requirements, which makes it inappropriate to compare test scores before and after 
2002. Therefore, test scores after 2002 are used in this study. In the 2003-2004 school year
11
 
Indiana began to administer the assessments in reading and math to all students in third through 
tenth grade. Overall, the Indiana data set contains information related to test scores, finance, and 
demographics from 2002 to 2006. 
In the case of Minnesota, at the beginning of NCLB (i.e., 2001), students in third and fifth 
grade were tested in math and reading, with seventh grade added in 2004. Minnesota has tested 
                                                 
11 Indiana administered its assessments in Septembers before 2008, meaning that the tests administered in the 2003-2004 school 
year actually assessed how students learned in the 2002-2003 school year. Thus, in the remaining of this dissertation, whenever a 
year is mentioned, it refers to the spring term of the school year, i.e., 2002 in the text refers the 2001-2002 school year. 
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all students in grades three through eight in math and reading, plus grade 10 reading and grade 11 
math since 2006. In the same year the state changed its assessments to align with new academic 
standards. The Minnesota data set contains information related to test scores, finance, and 
demographics from 2001 to 2007. 
South Carolina has its own school accountability system other than NCLB. The state has 
administered assessments in math and reading to all students in grades three through eight since 
2001 and in science and social studies since 2003, making it a good choice to analyze the 
tradeoffs among different subjects.  
When it comes to specifying models using each state’s data, it is essential to make some 
adjustments based on each state’s data characteristics. As mentioned earlier, only grade 3 and 5 
were tested prior to 2004 in Minnesota. Therefore, using test scores prior to NCLB (i.e. 2001 and 
2002) to classify unthreatened and threatened schools makes most middle schools fall into the 
threatened group since they do not have third and fifth grade. Thus, it is necessary to use 
different criteria to classify unthreatened and threatened groups for elementary and middle 
schools. For the elementary level, schools are classified as unthreatened schools (threatened 
dummy = 0) if their third and fifth test scores
12
 in 2001 and in 2002 are higher than 2003 state 
proficiency targets, the first year of state proficiency targets; otherwise they are threatened 
schools. Note that schools that do not have third and fifth grades have missing values of 
threatened. At the secondary level, schools are deemed to be unthreatened if their seventh grade 
                                                 
12 Test scores here refer to the minimum of the lower bounds of confidence intervals of the observed test scores.  
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test scores
13
 in 2004 are higher than state proficiency targets in that year; otherwise they are 
threatened schools.  
Additionally, Minnesota changed its assessments in 2006, making it inappropriate to 
compare test scores of 2006 and 2007 to those of previous years. The solution to this problem is 
to analyze 2006 and 2007 data separately from 2001-2005 data (including the fitting of the DEA 
models) as if schools in these two periods faced different production frontiers.  
South Carolina models also need to be adjusted based on the availability of the data. The 
South Carolina Department of Education does not provide enrollment information on Limited 
English proficiency (LEP) students. Thus, it is not feasible to run the original DEA models, one 
of whose inputs is the percentage of LEP students, as discussed in the previous section. I have 
replaced the percentage of LEP students with the percentage of Hispanic students in the South 
Carolina DEA models. It is found that a large proportion of LEP students are Hispanic 
(Development Associates, Inc., 2003). Thus, the percentage of Hispanic students can be a good 
substitute of LEP students in DEA models. Because of the inclusion of Hispanic students in the 
models, the percentage of minority students was replaced by the percentage of African American 
students accordingly. Consequently, the inputs used in the first stage DEA models for South 
Carolina include per-pupil expenditure (PPE), the percentage of students eligible for free and 
reduced-priced lunch (FRL), the percentage of African American students (Black), and the 
percentage of Hispanic students (Hispanic). 
                                                 
13 Similarly, test scores here refer to the minimum of the lower bounds of confidence intervals of the observed test scores. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
Have Schools Improved Efficiency over Time? 
As discussed, at the first stage four DEA models for Indiana and Minnesota and five for 
South Carolina are estimated using different pairs of outputs, based on different assumptions. 
Generally, the DEA models within each state yield similar results in terms of the magnitudes of 
efficiency and slack. Thus, this dissertation only reports results for Indiana and Minnesota of 
Models 1 and 2, which give estimates for math and reading, respectively, and results for South 
Carolina of Models 1 to 4, which provide estimates for math, reading, science, and social studies, 
respectively, as well as a fifth model containing all four subjects. The full results from other 
models are presented in the appendix.  
The results of mean efficiency from 2001 to 2007 for each state are presented in Table 2 – 
Table 4. Overall, schools in three states are fairly inefficient in producing math and reading 
achievement, which is consistent with other studies’ conclusions. The average efficiencies in 
both math and reading for South Carolina are substantially less than those for other two states. 
Since each state has its own assessments and production frontier, however, it is meaningless to 
compare the results across three states. Thus, in the following discussion, each state’s results will 
be reported separately, in the order of Minnesota, Indiana, and South Carolina. However, it 
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should be cautious when interpreting results of mean efficiency because of the threats to validity 
discussed in the early sections. Because of the possibility that student test scores do not reflect 
the real learning, the estimated mean efficiency scores reported here may not necessarily 
illustrate the actual efficiency. As noted above, the difference-in-differences estimator presented 
later deals with many of these threats. 
 
Minnesota 
 Measures of mean efficiency for Minnesota schools are presented in Table 2, with 2a 
reporting results of math and 2b results of reading. In the case of Minnesota, the average 
efficiency in math ranges from .636 in eighth grade to .737 in third grade, and that in reading 
ranges from .71 in eighth grade to .778 in fifth grade. Thus, on average schools achieve 73.7% of 
the feasible level of math achievement (i.e., percentage of ADV and percentage of (PRF+ADV) 
students) and 75.6% of the feasible level of reading achievement in third grade. Schools would 
have had 26.3% more ADV and (PRF+ADV) students in math and 24.4% more in reading in 
third grade had they operated efficiently. In addition, Table 2 shows that efficiency is higher for 
reading than for math, especially in grades six and eight, implying that resources are relatively 
better utilized in producing reading achievement.  
Generally, schools in Minnesota have raised their efficiency in producing math and reading 
achievement over time in the grades that tested in several years (i.e., third, fifth, and seventh 
grades). However, these grades show different patterns of improvements. In third grade, 
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efficiency in math and reading has increased steadily from pre-NCLB years to post-NCLB years, 
increasing from .68 in 2001 to .79 in 2007. Fifth and seventh grade increased efficiency from 
2001 to 2005, but dropped substantially in 2006 and 2007.  
 
Table 2, Mean Efficiency by Grade and Year, Model 1 and Model 2, Minnesota 
2a, Efficiency in Math (Model 1) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.677 0.665 0.733 0.719 0.790 0.784 0.789 0.737 
Grade 4 
     
0.709 0.717 0.713 
Grade 5 0.691 0.720 0.766 0.753 0.826 0.642 0.686 0.726 
Grade 6 
     
0.637 0.678 0.658 
Grade 7 
   
0.714 0.825 0.646 0.686 0.718 
Grade 8           0.641 0.631 0.636 
  
       
  
2b, Efficiency in Reading (Model 2) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.694 0.683 0.739 0.749 0.798 0.825 0.806 0.756 
Grade 4 
     
0.787 0.739 0.763 
Grade 5 0.761 0.768 0.785 0.768 0.831 0.784 0.753 0.778 
Grade 6 
     
0.759 0.724 0.742 
Grade 7 
   
0.761 0.819 0.744 0.697 0.755 
Grade 8           0.723 0.697 0.710 
 
 One possible explanation of decreasing efficiency in fifth and seventh grade was the increase 
in the number of grades tested in 2006 when fourth, sixth, and eighth grade were added to the 
testing program. When more grades are tested, schools need to redistribute their resources among 
tested grades to make every tested student proficient and make AYP. Given the fixed amount of 
resources, each tested grade will get fewer resources when more grades are tested. This 
possibility will be tested in the second stage analysis. 
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Indiana 
 Mean efficiencies for Indiana schools are reported in Table 3, with 3a showing results of 
math and 3b results of reading. Schools in Indiana have an average efficiency in math ranging 
from .685 in fourth grade to .785 in sixth and eighth grade, and in reading from .742 in seventh 
grade to .782 in third and fifth grade. The average efficiencies across grades do not differ 
significantly, except for fourth grade math. On average, fourth grade in Indiana only achieves 
68.5% of the feasible level of math outputs under current operations, while in other grades 
efficiency exceeds 74%.  
 When we compare the average efficiency in math with that in reading, it is found that 
elementary grades, third, fourth, and fifth grade, do a better job in reading, but perform less 
satisfactorily in math than the other three grades. The elementary grades’ average efficiency in 
reading was around .78, while the numbers for the middle school grades (six to eighth) were .74 
or .76. The pattern in math is switched: as the middle school grades’ efficiency in math was 
approximately .78, the elementary grades’ was .69 to .76. However, the difference across the six 
grades was not substantial.  
 The estimates of efficiency in math and in reading increased from 2002 to 2006, except for 
third grade math. The biggest increase happened in sixth grade math. In 2002 the estimate of 
efficiency in math of sixth grade was .741, suggesting that sixth grade achieved 74.1% of the 
feasible output level in 2002. It increased to .82 in 2006, which is transformed into an 8% 
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increase in ADV and (PRF+ADV) students in math. As for third grade, it did not improve its 
efficiency in math over time. However, the decrease in efficiency in math for third grade was 
very small, only 1%. 
 
Table 3, Mean Efficiency by Grade and Year, Model 1 and Model 2, Indiana 
3a, Efficiency in Math (Model 1) 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 0.741 0.754 0.752 0.744 0.728 0.744 
Grade 4 
 
0.678 0.684 0.685 0.694 0.685 
Grade 5 
 
0.733 0.757 0.761 0.771 0.755 
Grade 6 0.741 0.760 0.791 0.815 0.820 0.785 
Grade 7 
 
0.761 0.775 0.789 0.801 0.781 
Grade 8 0.777 0.780 0.781 0.776 0.810 0.785 
       3b, Efficiency in Reading (Model 2) 
   2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 0.779 0.789 0.778 0.773 0.794 0.782 
Grade 4 
 
0.772 0.774 0.789 0.783 0.780 
Grade 5 
 
0.766 0.774 0.793 0.797 0.782 
Grade 6 0.725 0.733 0.737 0.741 0.752 0.737 
Grade 7 
 
0.748 0.735 0.730 0.758 0.742 
Grade 8 0.739 0.762 0.755 0.756 0.769 0.756 
 
South Carolina 
 Results of mean efficiency for schools in South Carolina are reported in Table 4, which 
consists of four panels that present results of math, reading, science, and social studies, 
respectively. Schools in South Carolina were very inefficient in using their resources to produce 
educational outcomes. On average, they only achieved less than 50% of the feasible level of 
outputs, for all four subjects tested, with the exception of third grade reading. Take third grade 
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for example, the average efficiency in math was .37 and that in reading was .528 across seven 
years, meaning that without using more inputs third grade in South Carolina would have 
achieved 63% more ADV and (PRF+ADV) students in math and 47.2% more ADV and 
(PRF+ADV) students in reading if they had operated at the efficient level.  
 The estimates of efficiency in math for the higher grades (sixth through eighth) increased 
steadily from 2001 to 2005 but decreased afterward. The lower grades did not have clear patterns 
in the changes of estimates of efficiency; they went up and down differently across seven years. 
Similarly, there are no obvious patterns in the estimates of efficiency in reading, as the estimates 
for each grade fluctuate greatly over time. Nonetheless, the estimates of efficiency for all grades, 
except for third grade, reached the lowest point in 2003, the year when NCLB took effect as well 
as when science and social studies were tested.  
 As noted, South Carolina tested not only math and reading, the two mandatory tested 
subjects under NCLB, but also science and social studies, which makes it possible to look at the 
issue of tradeoffs between high-stakes subjects, i.e. math and reading, and low-stakes subjects, 
i.e. science and social studies. One possible way to examine the tradeoffs among subjects was to 
estimate schools’ efficiency in producing low-stakes test scores. Panel 4c and 4d in Table 4 
report the results of mean efficiency in these two low-stakes subjects. 
Overall, the average efficiency in science and social studies was lower than that in math and 
reading, ranging from .292 in third grade to .459 in seventh grade for science and .309 in fifth 
grade to .441 in eighth grade for social studies. In addition, the higher grades, in particular 
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seventh and eighth grade, have higher efficiency in science and social studies than the 
elementary grades by approximately 10%. 
 Each grade has different patterns in terms of the change of efficiency in science and social 
studies. Take third grade for example, the estimates of efficiency in science stayed relatively 
stable from 2003 to 2006 and increased in 2007, while those in social studies increased steadily 
over time. The estimates of efficiency in both subjects for fourth grade also continuously 
increased over time. Fifth and sixth grade raised their estimates of efficiency in both subjects 
from 2003 to 2005, dropped in 2006, and then moved up again in 2007. The estimates of 
efficiency in science for seventh grade went up after 2003, stayed relatively stable from 2004 and 
2006 and then increased again in 2007. Additionally, seventh grade social studies and eighth 
grade science have the same patterns as fifth and sixth grade. However, the pattern of efficiency 
in social studies for eighth grade was different from others; the estimate was increased 
substantially from 2003 to 2004 and 2005, but dropped greatly in 2006 and 2007. 
 Despite the different patterns of changes in efficiency in two low-stakes subjects, overall the 
estimates of efficiency across grades, except for eighth grade social studies, are increased when 
we compare the first and the last year’s results. For instance, the middle school grades had 
greater efficiency in science by around 22%. In all grades except eighth, the estimate of 
efficiency in social studies increased by more than 10%. The increase in both low-stakes subjects, 
together with the relatively flat trends for high-stakes subjects, implies that low-stakes subjects in 
South Carolina were not ignored. 
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Table 4, Mean Efficiency by Grade and Year, Model 1 to Model 4, South Carolina 
4a, Efficiency in Math (Model 1) 
       2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.420 0.367 0.385 0.348 0.346 0.385 0.336 0.370 
Grade 4 0.322 0.408 0.385 0.405 0.449 0.442 0.447 0.408 
Grade 5 0.365 0.352 0.331 0.391 0.383 0.384 0.371 0.368 
Grade 6 0.307 0.322 0.413 0.424 0.431 0.403 0.409 0.387 
Grade 7 0.404 0.402 0.446 0.482 0.507 0.476 0.483 0.457 
Grade 8 0.333 0.347 0.350 0.400 0.424 0.416 0.353 0.375 
         4b, Efficiency in Reading (Model 2) 
      2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.474 0.442 0.480 0.599 0.589 0.557 0.552 0.528 
Grade 4 0.464 0.392 0.373 0.447 0.414 0.463 0.472 0.432 
Grade 5 0.394 0.329 0.268 0.361 0.384 0.439 0.390 0.366 
Grade 6 0.410 0.432 0.352 0.366 0.350 0.393 0.397 0.386 
Grade 7 0.509 0.443 0.386 0.423 0.398 0.419 0.465 0.435 
Grade 8 0.419 0.470 0.346 0.462 0.530 0.436 0.424 0.441 
         4c, Efficiency in Science (Model 3 for South Carolina) 
     2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 
  
0.282 0.267 0.296 0.278 0.336 0.292 
Grade 4 
  
0.295 0.354 0.374 0.395 0.439 0.371 
Grade 5 
  
0.295 0.332 0.362 0.344 0.404 0.347 
Grade 6 
  
0.281 0.388 0.416 0.339 0.457 0.376 
Grade 7 
  
0.343 0.466 0.464 0.458 0.565 0.459 
Grade 8 
  
0.329 0.375 0.467 0.428 0.541 0.428 
         4d, Efficiency in Social Studies (Model 4 for South Carolina) 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 
  
0.242 0.289 0.373 0.421 0.455 0.356 
Grade 4 
  
0.239 0.337 0.362 0.371 0.398 0.342 
Grade 5 
  
0.261 0.303 0.327 0.298 0.359 0.309 
Grade 6 
  
0.205 0.327 0.368 0.358 0.437 0.339 
Grade 7 
  
0.374 0.440 0.461 0.403 0.495 0.434 
Grade 8 
  
0.381 0.508 0.512 0.481 0.325 0.441 
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 It is worth examining why schools in South Carolina were substantially less efficient than 
counterparts in Indiana and Minnesota. One way to examine the issue is to look at the scatter plot 
of two outputs, ADV and (PRF+ADV), for each state. Since DEA measures individual school’s 
efficiency based on the comparison of the individual school to other schools with similar input 
level, I selected a subset of observations that have the same reference group as estimated by 
DEA, ensuring that those observations have similar input levels
14
. Figure 7 contains scatter plots 
of ADV and (PRF+ADV) in reading in third grade for three states.  
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Figure 7, Scatter Plot of Two Outputs (ADV and PRF+ADV), Reading for Grade 3, 
by States 
                                                 
14 I have tried to examine observations with different sets of reference group for three states and the similar patterns are found. 
Therefore, the Figures reported here can be considered as the representative of the data distribution across states. 
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Every state has a distinctive scatter plot, which in part explains the differences in mean 
efficiency among them. Minnesota has a positive relationship between ADV and (PRF+ADV), 
indicating that schools that have fewer below proficiency students tend to have more advanced 
students. As far as Indiana concerned, the scatter plot of two outputs is more spread out relative 
to that of Minnesota and does not show a clear pattern of the relationship, implying that schools 
that have fewer below proficiency students do not necessarily have more advanced students.  
Unlike the other two states, a majority of schools in South Carolina are concentrated on the 
lower left corner of the graph, suggesting that many schools have very low percentage of 
advanced students. Virtually no schools have more than 20% of advanced students in reading in 
third grade. Thus, a few high-achieving schools determined the production frontier, with most 
schools lying far below it, accounting for to their low efficiency scores.  
One reason for the overall low percentage of advanced students in South Carolina is that 
South Carolina is one of the states with the most difficult proficiency standards in the nation 
(Cronin, Dahlin, Adkins, & Kingsbury, 2007). Because of the high proficiency cut scores in 
South Carolina, it is natural that fewer students can reach the advanced level. Minnesota and 
Indiana’s proficiency cut scores are around the national median, which partially explains the 
difference in average efficiency between them and South Carolina. 
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Has NCLB Influenced the Change of School Efficiency over Time? 
Although average estimates of efficiency have increased since NCLB was introduced, it is 
unclear whether the increase reflects real improvement in efficiency because of the threats to 
validity discussed in the methodology section. It is possible that easier tests or students’ 
familiarity with tests will result in higher test scores without real improvement in students’ real 
learning. If so, estimates of efficiency are inflated.  However, valid inferences about the effect 
of NCL B on efficiency can still be made using the difference-in-differences estimator that 
compares trends in efficiency between unthreatened and threatened schools, as discussed in this 
section.  
Overall, as expected, unthreatened schools on average have higher efficiency than threatened 
schools across three states. However, differences between two groups of schools were not the 
same in Minnesota, Indiana, and South Carolina. Thus, similar to the previous section, this 
section reports three states’ results separately.  
 
Minnesota 
Mean efficiency for unthreatened and threatened schools for each tested grade from 2001 to 
2007 are depicted in Figures 8 – 10, with Figure 8 illustrating results for third grade, Figure 9 
fifth grade, and Figure 10 seventh grade, respectively
15
. The gaps in efficiency between 
unthreatened and threatened schools were fairly large in all three grades when the assessments 
                                                 
15 Since 4th, 6th, and 8th grade were only tested for two years and did not have apparent trends, they are not included in the 
Figures. Rather, their results, together with other three grades’, are reported in Table B.1 in the Appendix B. 
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were first administered. For instance, both third and fifth grade had a gap of 20% in 2001 and 
seventh grade had a gap of 16% in 2004 between two groups of schools with regard to efficiency 
in math. The corresponding gaps in reading were 18%, 15%, and 13%.  
Generally, the gap in efficiency is bigger in math than that in reading. It is possible that math 
teachers in different schools have substantially different quality. Given the fact that public 
schools are short of highly-qualified math teachers (Fetler, 1999; Ingersoll, 1999; National 
Commission on Teaching and America's Future, 1996), low-performing schools may have more 
difficulties in recruiting good math teachers, which results in even lower math achievement. 
The gaps in efficiency for both math and reading narrowed over time, though the patterns 
varied across the three grades.  In third grade, unthreatened schools are more efficient in 
producing math achievement than threatened counterparts by 20.7% in 2001. But the gap 
between them is reduced to 8.7% in 2007. Similarly, the discrepancy in efficiency with regard to 
producing reading achievement for third grade drops to 9.2% in 2007 from 18% in 2001. In the 
case of fifth grade, the gap in efficiency does not close as much as that for third grade, declining 
substantially from 19.6% in 2001 to 8.6% in 2005 but increasing again to 13.7% in 2006 and 
11.1% in 2007 with respect to math and from 15.3% in 2001 to 9% in 2005 through 2007 with 
respect to reading.  
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Figure 8, Trends in Efficiency, Grade 3, Minnesota 
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Figure 9, Trends in Efficiency, Grade 5, Minnesota 
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Figure 10, Trends in Efficiency, Grade 7, Minnesota 
 
As noted earlier, the changes in the difference in efficiency between unthreatened and 
threatened schools capture the effects of NCLB. Thus, the narrowing of the efficiency gap from 
2001 to 2007 implies that NCLB has had a positive impact on school efficiency: schools, 
especially threatened ones, tended to raise their efficiency after NCLB was introduced. To test 
these differences for statistical significance, the second-stage model described above was 
estimated using estimated efficiency at the school level as the dependent variable. Results are 
presented in Table 5. The upper panel is results for elementary schools and the lower panel for 
middle schools. The first four columns report results for math and the last four results for 
reading. 
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The first two columns of Table 5, with the first one indicating coefficient and the second one 
standard error, are results of the baseline model. Unthreatened schools at elementary levels do 
not greatly change their efficiency after NCLB is implemented. Most of the coefficients on year 
dummies are not statistically significant, and even for the statistically significant ones, their 
magnitudes are small (no more than .05). This result confirms our assumption that unthreatened 
elementary schools do not have an incentive to become more efficient. Furthermore, the small 
magnitude of coefficients implies that there are no test effects in elementary schools causing 
differences in performance over time.  
The coefficients on threatened school interacted with year are positive and significant. 
Overall, they increase steadily from 2002, reaching a peak in 2005 or 2006 depending on the 
model, and then decrease slightly afterward. This result suggests that NCLB has a significant 
impact on school efficiency at the elementary level. 
 The results for middle schools, however, differ greatly from those for elementary schools. 
Unthreatened schools appear to be less efficient in 2006 and 2007 than earlier.  The differences 
are about 7% in math and 6% and 10% in reading.  On the assumption that unthreatened 
schools have not changed their behavior in response to NCLB, these negative coefficients  
likely represent test effects of some kind.    
The coefficients on the interactions with the threatened school indicator are positive, 
although not all of them are statistically significant. In math, threatened middle schools were 
more efficient by 10% in 2005 than in 2004 (the baseline year), but the corresponding 
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coefficients in 2006 and 2007 are smaller (.007 and .021, respectively) and statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, there is improvement in reading model in 2005 of .063, but only .036 
and .022 in 2006 and 2007, respectively. These results indicate that threatened schools improved 
their efficiency in producing math and reading achievement in 2005, but that progress slipped 
after new assessments were introduced in 2006. 
 Before concluding that in Minnesota NCLB has had a positive impact on efficiency, we need 
to consider two potentially confounding factors. The first confounding factor is the fact that 
Minnesota began to test more grades (grade 3 through 8) in 2006, which may alter the 
distribution of resources among grades and affect each grade’s efficiency. Second, higher 
efficiency in post-NCLB years may be due to mean-reversion. If schools had bad luck resulting 
in abnormally low test scores in 2001 and 2002, they could have been mistakenly classified as 
threatened schools. The large gains they experienced in later years would not have been the 
effect of NCLB, but the consequence of moving back to a more normal level of performance.  
 To distinguish NCLB effects from those confounding effects, we have conducted several 
tests. First we examine whether testing more grades, as occurred after 2006, affected schools’ 
performance. We create a new variable measuring the ratio of students in tested grades, or 
high-stakes grades, to school’s total enrollment. The results of the models including this new 
variable – pct_highstakes – and its interaction with the threatened school dummy are presented in 
the third and fourth column for each model in Table 5.  
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Table 5, Coefficients from 2nd-stage Models, Model 1 and Model 2, Minnesota 
Using Efficiency as Dependent Variable  
 
Efficiency in Math Efficiency in Reading 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.690 (0.003) 0.729 (0.006) 0.717 (0.003) 0.737 (0.005) 
Year 2002 0.002 (0.008) 0.002 (0.008) -0.001 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 
Year 2003 0.022 (0.008) 0.022 (0.008) 0.008 (0.007) 0.008 (0.007) 
Year 2004 0.009 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008) 0.000 (0.007) 0.000 (0.007) 
Year 2005 0.055 (0.008) 0.056 (0.008) 0.038 (0.007) 0.038 (0.007) 
Year 2006 -0.017 (0.008) 0.013 (0.011) 0.030 (0.006) 0.046 (0.009) 
Year 2007 -0.010 (0.008) 0.019 (0.010) 0.004 (0.006) 0.019 (0.009) 
Grade 4 -0.017 (0.004) -0.017 (0.004) -0.017 (0.003) -0.017 (0.003) 
Grade 5 -0.007 (0.002) -0.007 (0.002) 0.026 (0.002) 0.026 (0.002) 
Threatened*Year 2002 0.005 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009) -0.002 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2003 0.053 (0.009) 0.053 (0.009) 0.034 (0.008) 0.034 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2004 0.056 (0.009) 0.056 (0.009) 0.043 (0.008) 0.043 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.089 (0.009) 0.089 (0.009) 0.063 (0.008) 0.063 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.059 (0.009) 0.064 (0.012) 0.063 (0.007) 0.065 (0.010) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.074 (0.009) 0.079 (0.012) 0.053 (0.007) 0.055 (0.010) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
-0.115 (0.028) 
  
-0.061 (0.023) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
-0.020 (0.034) 
  
-0.010 (0.028) 
         Middle Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.680 (0.009) 0.675 (0.013) 0.762 (0.008) 0.785 (0.011) 
Year 2005 0.025 (0.024) 0.024 (0.024) -0.002 (0.021) -0.002 (0.021) 
Year 2006 -0.069 (0.020) -0.120 (0.056) -0.058 (0.017) -0.039 (0.049) 
Year 2007 -0.058 (0.020) -0.110 (0.056) -0.090 (0.017) -0.071 (0.049) 
Grade 7 0.046 (0.008) 0.046 (0.008) 0.015 (0.007) 0.015 (0.007) 
Grade 8 0.027 (0.008) 0.027 (0.008) 0.018 (0.007) 0.018 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.096 (0.026) 0.097 (0.026) 0.063 (0.022) 0.063 (0.022) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.007 (0.021) 0.056 (0.060) 0.036 (0.018) 0.068 (0.053) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.021 (0.021) 0.071 (0.060) 0.022 (0.018) 0.053 (0.053) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
0.098 (0.099) 
  
-0.034 (0.087) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
-0.093 (0.107) 
  
-0.066 (0.093) 
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The coefficient on this ratio is negative and significant at the elementary level (-.115 and 
-.061 for the math and reading model, respectively), suggesting that having more students in 
high-stakes grades decreases efficiency of unthreatened elementary schools. However, threatened 
schools do not differ significantly from unthreatened ones with regard to the impact of testing 
more grades, as the coefficient of the interaction between pct_highstakes with the threatened 
dummy is insignificant. Additionally, the coefficients on the interaction terms from the extended 
models do not differ substantially from those from the basic model. Thus, the positive NCLB 
effect at the elementary school level remains.  
At the middle school level, having more grades tested does not influence efficiency for 
either threatened or unthreatened schools as the coefficients on pct_highstakes are not 
statistically significant. Moreover, the inclusion of the new variable does not alter greatly the 
coefficients on the interaction terms in the extended models compared to the baseline models; 
even though the coefficients on the interaction terms become larger in the extended models, they 
are still statistically insignificant. Therefore, conclusions about the NCLB effect at the middle 
school level are not change by controlling for the percentage of students tested. 
 Second, to investigate whether there is mean reversion, we change our criteria of defining 
unthreatened and threatened schools. Rather than using both 2001 and 2002 test results, we use 
only 2001 results. Thus, coefficient estimates for 2002 will capture mean reversion effects, if any, 
so that comparisons between 2002’s estimates with later years’ will tell the net increase of 
66 
 
efficiency. Results are similar to those reported above
16
 with little change in the estimated rate of 
improvement among threatened schools. Estimates for later years differ significantly from 2002 
estimates, suggesting that threatened schools significantly raised efficiency after NCLB was 
implemented. 
 
Indiana 
 The trends in efficiency in Indiana for three grades that have pre-NCLB test scores (third, 
sixth, and eighth) by school type (Unthreatened vs. Threatened) are illustrated in Figures 11 – 
13
17
. In all three grades, unthreatened schools are more efficient at the outset of our sample 
period. In third grade math, unthreatened schools are more efficient than threatened schools by 
13.7%. The gaps in sixth and eighth grades are 14.8% and 12.4%, respectively. Patterns in 
reading are similar, with corresponding gaps of 12.8%, 14.4%, and 15%. 
 As in Minnesota, the gap in efficiency declined during the NCLB years, particularly in 2003. 
The gaps narrowed to around 11% for all tested subjects across three grades in 2003, a reduction 
of approximately 1% to 4% from 2002. In later years, the gaps continued to narrow, though the 
reductions were not very large. These results imply that NCLB has had a positive impact on 
school efficiency in Indiana, though as in the case of Minnesota, we will need to confirm this by 
testing for the presence of mean reversion. 
                                                 
16 Therefore, Table 5 contains results from analyses using both 2001 and 2002 test scores to classify unthreatened and threatened 
schools, and the results from analyses using only 2001 test scores to classify two groups of schools are reported in the appendix. 
17 These three grades are discussed here because our focus is on the comparison before and after NCLB. The results for other 
three grades that do not have pre-NCLB test scores (i.e. fourth, fifth, and seventh) are illustrated in the appendix. 
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Figure 11, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 3, by Subjects, Indiana 
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Figure 12, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 6, by Subjects, Indiana 
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Figure 13, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 8, by Subjects, Indiana 
 
Results of the second-stage models that estimated relationships between NCLB and 
efficiency for Indiana are reported in Table 6, where the upper panel contains results for 
elementary schools and the lower results for middle schools. The first two columns present 
results for math and the latter two results for reading. The coefficients on year dummies indicate 
a small, statistically significant decline in efficiency (though no more than .05 for math and .03 
for reading). Given the assumption that unthreatened schools do not have incentives to change 
their behavior, these are presumably due to factors other than NCLB. 
The coefficients on the interactions between threatened school dummy and year dummies 
are positive and statistically significant, for both math and reading, at the elementary level. In 
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math, for example, there is an improvement of .037 in 2003 relative to 2002 (the baseline). The 
coefficients increased thereafter, reaching a peak of .066 in 2006. Similarly, the coefficients on 
these interactions in reading are positive and statistically significant, meaning that NCLB has had 
a positive, significant influence on school efficiency in reading, though the improvement is not 
as great as in math.   
Like elementary schools, unthreatened middle schools experienced a modest decline in 
efficiency after the start of NCLB.  In math, this decline was reversed after 2004. Nonetheless, 
the magnitudes of the coefficients for both math and reading are fairly small, ranging from -.006 
to -.037, suggesting that unthreatened middle schools have not changed their behavior 
significantly. 
 Threatened middle schools have positive and statistically significant coefficients that have 
increased in both subjects: .03 in 2003, .05 in 2004 and 2005, and .06 in 2006. As mentioned 
earlier, it is possible that the increase of efficiency in unthreatened schools is due to mean 
reversion. To examine this issue, I compare the coefficient on the interaction terms for 2003 to 
those of later years. It is very likely that mean reversion will happen in second year in the dataset, 
i.e. 2003 in the current case, given that classification as threatened or unthreatened was based on 
2002 performance. The differences between 2003 and other years in terms of the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction terms from second-stage models are reported in Table 7. The 
estimates of 2004, 2005, and 2006 are found to be significantly different from those of 2003, 
suggesting that threatened schools significantly raised efficiency after NCLB was implemented.  
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Table 6, Coefficients from 2nd-stage Models, Model 1 and Model 2, Indiana 
Using Efficiency as Dependent Variable  
  
Efficiency in Math Efficiency in Reading 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Intercept 0.743 (0.003) 0.782 (0.002) 
 
Year 2003 -0.034 (0.008) -0.018 (0.006) 
 
Year 2004 -0.034 (0.008) -0.028 (0.006) 
 
Year 2005 -0.039 (0.008) -0.024 (0.006) 
 
Year 2006 -0.049 (0.008) -0.030 (0.006) 
 
Grade 4 -0.059 (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) 
 
Grade 5 0.011 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
Threatened*Year 2003 0.037 (0.009) 0.019 (0.007) 
 
Threatened*Year 2004 0.048 (0.009) 0.030 (0.007) 
 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.052 (0.009) 0.036 (0.007) 
 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.066 (0.009) 0.051 (0.007) 
      Middle Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Intercept 0.749 (0.003) 0.723 (0.003) 
 
Year 2003 -0.011 (0.007) -0.013 (0.008) 
 
Year 2004 -0.007 (0.008) -0.037 (0.008) 
 
Year 2005 0.006 (0.008) -0.034 (0.008) 
 
Year 2006 0.011 (0.008) -0.027 (0.008) 
 
Grade 7 -0.015 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 
 
Grade 8 0.026 (0.004) 0.041 (0.004) 
Threatened*Year 2003 0.030 (0.008) 0.031 (0.008) 
 
Threatened*Year 2004 0.048 (0.008) 0.053 (0.008) 
 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.050 (0.008) 0.050 (0.008) 
 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.058 (0.008) 0.060 (0.008) 
 
 To summarize, in Indiana there are small changes in efficiency that appear to be attributable 
to factors other than NCLB. However, significant differences between trends among threatened 
and unthreatened schools indicate that NCLB has had a positive, significant influence on 
efficiency in public schools in Indiana. 
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Table 7, Difference in Coefficients on Interaction Terms between 2003 and Later Years 
 
Reading Math 
Elementary Schools 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
2004-2003 -0.012 (0.005) -0.011 (0.006) 
2005-2003 -0.018 (0.005) -0.015 (0.006) 
2006-2003 -0.032 (0.005) -0.029 (0.006) 
     Middle Schools 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
2004-2003 -0.022 (0.007) -0.017 (0.007) 
2005-2003 -0.019 (0.008) -0.020 (0.007) 
2006-2003 -0.029 (0.008) -0.028 (0.007) 
 
South Carolina 
 Trends in efficiency in math and reading for third through eighth grade in South Carolina are 
depicted in Figures 14 – 19. Unthreatened schools were more efficient in math than threatened 
schools by about 20% in the elementary grades (i.e. third to fifth grade), 24% in sixth grade, and 
30% in seventh and eighth grade. The gaps in reading were approximately 20% across grades. 
However, unlike in Minnesota and Indiana, the gaps in both subjects in South Carolina did not 
close, with the exception of eighth grade. 
 There are no obvious patterns on the gaps in efficiency between two types of schools in both 
subjects from third to sixth grade. The gap in math for seventh grade decreased from .288 in 
2001 to .213 in 2007, a nearly 8% reduction over time, while that for eighth grade declined 
from .308 to .152. In the case of reading, the gap for seventh grade has fluctuated frequently over 
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time, but not closed much when the first and the last year are compared (.227 in 2001 and .192 in 
2007, respectively). Nonetheless, the gap for eighth grade narrowed continuously from .242 in 
2001 to .182 in 2007. 
To conclude, there is little change in the gaps in efficiency for third to sixth grade, a 
moderate change in math and minor change in reading for seventh grade, and a substantial 
change in math and moderate change in reading for eighth grade. Therefore, there is no strong 
evidence that NCLB has had a significant impact on efficiency in math and reading in South 
Carolina. 
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Figure 14, Trends in Efficiency in High-Stakes Subjects for Grade 3, South Carolina 
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Figure 15, Trends in Efficiency in High-Stakes Subjects for Grade 4, South Carolina 
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Figure 16, Trends in Efficiency in High-Stakes Subjects for Grade 5, South Carolina 
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Figure 17, Trends in Efficiency in High-Stakes Subjects for Grade 6, South Carolina 
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Figure 18, Trends in Efficiency in High-Stakes Subjects for Grade 7, South Carolina 
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Figure 19, Trends in Efficiency in High-Stakes Subjects for Grade 8, South Carolina 
 
 In addition to the two high-stakes subjects, South Carolina has also administered tests in two 
low-stakes subjects, science and social studies, to all students in third through eighth grade since 
2003. The next discussion focuses on the changes of the differences in efficiency in these two 
low-stakes subjects between unthreatened and threatened schools over time. Generally, the 
patterns of the changes in efficiency in science and social studies are rather similar to those in 
math and reading across all grades. Thus, only seventh and eighth grade’s results are illustrated 
in Figures 20 – 21, while others are included in the appendix. 
 The disparity in efficiency for seventh grade did not change much until 2007 when it closed 
to .15 in science and .19 in social studies, respectively. Compared to seventh grade, eighth grade 
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has significantly closed the gaps in two subjects. In 2001 unthreatened schools were more 
efficient than threatened ones in science and social studies by .22 and .24, respectively, which 
decreased considerably to .10 after six years. The results imply that NCLB has had a positive 
impact on efficiency in science and social studies for seventh and eighth grade and that schools 
in South Carolina may not completely ignore low-stakes subjects, especially at the higher grade 
levels. This implication is tested using a model whose outputs are the percentage of proficient 
and above in all four tested subjects. The results of the new model will be reported in the next 
section. 
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Figure 20, Trends in Efficiency in Low-Stakes Subjects for Grade 7, South Carolina 
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Figure 21, Trends in Efficiency in Low-Stakes Subjects for Grade 8, South Carolina 
 
 Results of the second-stage analysis which uses efficiency as the dependent variable are 
presented in Table 8. The upper panel is results for elementary schools and the lower results for 
middle schools. Most of the coefficients on year dummies in both math and reading are not 
statistically significant. The only significant ones are in 2006, .02 for math and .04 for reading, 
respectively.  
 The coefficients on the interactions for two high-stakes subjects at the elementary level are 
not statistically significant until 2004. Unthreatened schools improved efficiency in both subjects 
by .02 in 2004 relative to 2001 (the baseline) and stayed relatively stable afterward, with the 
exception of reading in 2006. These results mean that threatened elementary schools became 
slightly more efficient in high-stakes subjects than unthreatened counterparts after 2004. 
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Table 8, Coefficients from 2nd-stage Models, Model 1 to Model 4, South Carolina 
Using Efficiency as Dependent Variable 
  TE in Math TE in Reading TE in Science TE in Social Studies 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. E. Coef. Std. E. Coef. Std. E. Coef. Std. E. 
Intercept 0.353 (0.004) 0.529 (0.003) 0.248 (0.004) 0.269 (0.004) 
Year 2002 0.011 (0.007) -0.056 (0.007) 
    Year 2003 -0.002 (0.007) -0.073 (0.007) 
    Year 2004 -0.002 (0.008) 0.012 (0.007) 0.026 (0.007) 0.06 (0.008) 
Year 2005 0.002 (0.008) 0.003 (0.007) 0.046 (0.007) 0.112 (0.008) 
Year 2006 0.022 (0.008) 0.035 (0.007) 0.044 (0.008) 0.13 (0.008) 
Year 2007 -0.003 (0.008) 0.012 (0.007) 0.093 (0.008) 0.158 (0.008) 
Grade 4 0.043 (0.003) -0.094 (0.003) 0.08 (0.003) -0.013 (0.004) 
Grade 5 0.004 (0.003) -0.158 (0.003) 0.057 (0.004) -0.044 (0.004) 
Threatened*Year 2002 -0.005 (0.009) -0.0003 (0.009) 
    Threatened*Year 2003 0.004 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009) 
    Threatened*Year 2004 0.022 (0.009) 0.018 (0.009) -0.002 (0.009) -0.0002 (0.010) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.033 (0.009) 0.02 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) -0.013 (0.010) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.022 (0.009) 0.009 (0.009) 0.003 (0.009) -0.024 (0.010) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.028 (0.009) 0.018 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009) -0.012 (0.010) 
        
  
Middle Schools Coef. Std. E. Coef. Std. E. Coef. Std. E. Coef. Std. E. 
Intercept 0.316 (0.005) 0.396 (0.006) 0.281 (0.006) 0.256 (0.007) 
Year 2002 0.009 (0.022) 0.018 (0.022) 
    Year 2003 0.064 (0.022) -0.069 (0.023) 
    Year 2004 0.071 (0.022) -0.024 (0.023) 0.097 (0.025) 0.133 (0.028) 
Year 2005 0.071 (0.022) -0.027 (0.023) 0.109 (0.025) 0.131 (0.028) 
Year 2006 0.042 (0.022) -0.038 (0.023) 0.053 (0.025) 0.088 (0.028) 
Year 2007 0.019 (0.022) -0.038 (0.023) 0.135 (0.025) 0.07 (0.028) 
Grade 7 0.079 (0.005) 0.071 (0.005) 0.074 (0.006) 0.093 (0.007) 
Grade 8 -0.001 (0.005) 0.078 (0.005) 0.045 (0.006) 0.093 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2002 0.002 (0.023) -0.017 (0.024) 
    Threatened*Year 2003 -0.001 (0.023) -0.014 (0.024) 
    Threatened*Year 2004 0.028 (0.023) -0.005 (0.024) -0.004 (0.026) -0.029 (0.029) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.047 (0.023) 0.007 (0.024) 0.02 (0.026) -0.005 (0.029) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.056 (0.023) 0.014 (0.024) 0.036 (0.026) 0.012 (0.029) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.064 (0.023) 0.023 (0.024) 0.067 (0.026) 0.031 (0.029) 
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 The results of science and social studies are reported in the latter four columns in Table 8. 
The year dummies from two models are positive and statistically significant. Threatened middle 
schools improved efficiency by .026 and .06 for science and social studies, respectively, in 2004 
compared 2003 (the baseline). The numbers increased afterward, amounting to .093 for science 
and .158 for social studies in 2007. However, unthreatened schools did not differ greatly from 
threatened schools in efficiency, except for 2006. These results suggest that NCLB has no 
significant effect on school efficiency in science and social studies at elementary schools. 
 Middle schools in South Carolina have moderately different results compared to elementary 
schools. The coefficients on year dummies are negative but not statistically significant in reading, 
with the exception of 2003. The corresponding numbers for math are positive and statistically 
significant for 2003 to 2006. As for the coefficients on the interactions, they are not statistically 
significant for reading, but significant for math from 2005 to 2007, which are .047, .056, 
and .064, respectively. These results suggest that threatened middle schools are more efficient in 
math than unthreatened peers by 4.7%, 5.6%, and 6.4% respectively in 2005, 2006, and 2007, 
relative to 2001. Overall, NCLB has had a positive and significant impact on efficiency in math 
after two years of implementation and no effects in reading for middle schools in South Carolina.  
 With regard to two low-stakes subjects at the middle level, science and social studies, the 
coefficients on year dummies are statistically significant, implying that there are significant 
non-NCLB effects in low-stakes subjects. The coefficients on the interactions are not statistically 
80 
 
significant, except for science in 2007, meaning that NCLB has had no effect on efficiency in 
two low-stakes subjects. 
In sum, NCLB has had some effect on efficiency in math and reading at the elementary 
school level and in math at the middle school level after a few years of implementation, but no 
effect on efficiency in science and social studies in South Carolina. Whether the improvement in 
math and reading is achieved at the expense of low-stakes subjects is tested in the next section. 
 
Has NCLB Influenced Tradeoffs among Subjects? 
 To confirm the implication that schools do not ignore low-stakes subjects, we have analyzed 
a model in which the percentages of students who are proficient and higher in all four tested 
subjects are considered as four outputs (will be called Model 5 in the following discussions). The 
null hypothesis is that NCLB has led schools to improve student achievement in high-stakes 
subjects at the expense of low-stakes subjects. If it is correct, it is expected that Model 1 and 
Model 2 show a narrowing gap in efficiency in high-stakes subjects between unthreatened and 
threatened schools, while Model 5 does not. 
 Results of Model 5, as well as those of Models 1 and 2, are depicted in Figures 22 – 27. 
Within each figure, the first graph illustrates the result of Model 5. Results from three models for 
third and fourth grade are very similar; none of the gaps in efficiency between unthreatened and 
threatened schools declined. On the other hand, the gaps for the other grades (fifth to eighth) 
narrowed gradually over time. The findings are the opposite of what the hypothesis expects; 
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schools actually have improved achievement in science and social studies at the higher grade 
level. Therefore, there is no evidence that NCLB has led schools to improve achievement of 
high-stakes subjects to the detriment of low-stakes subjects in South Carolina. Rather, schools 
tend to equally focus on all tested subjects, especially in seventh and eighth grade. 
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Figure 22, Trends in Efficiency from Model 1, 2, and 5 for Grade 3, South Carolina 
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Figure 23, Trends in Efficiency from Model 1, 2, and 5 for Grade 4, South Carolina 
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Figure 24, Trends in Efficiency from Model 1, 2, and 5 for Grade 5, South Carolina 
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Figure 25, Trends in Efficiency from Model 1, 2, and 5 for Grade 6, South Carolina 
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Figure 26, Trends in Efficiency from Model 1, 2, and 5 for Grade 7, South Carolina 
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Figure 27, Trends in Efficiency from Model 1, 2, and 5 for Grade 8, South Carolina 
 
 Table 9 reports results of the second stage model whose dependent variable is measures of 
efficiency from Model 5. The first two columns present results of elementary schools and the last 
two results of middle schools. The coefficients on year dummies are positive and statistically 
significant, except for 2006 and 2007 at middle school level, suggesting that there are substantial 
non-NCLB effects at both the elementary school level and the middle school level. The 
coefficients on the interactions for both elementary and middle schools are positive and 
statistically significant, with the exception of 2004 at the middle school level, and steadily 
increase over time. Threatened elementary schools are more efficient than unthreatened peers in 
producing student achievement in four tested subjects by 2% in 2004 and 4% in 2007, relative to 
2003 (the baseline). 
85 
 
 Similarly, threatened middle schools are more efficient than unthreatened counterparts by 
11.7% in 2007, relative to 2003. The differences between threatened and unthreatened schools 
with respect to changes in efficiency are larger at the middle school level than those at the 
elementary level. To summarize, NCLB has had a positive and significant impact on efficiency in 
producing math, reading, science, and social studies, which suggests that the improvement in 
high-stakes subjects is accomplished without neglecting low-stakes subjects.  
 
Table 9, Coefficients from 2nd-stage Model, Model 5, South Carolina 
Using Efficiency as Dependent Variable 
Elementary Schools 
   
Middle Schools 
  
 
Coef. Std. Err. 
  
Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.530 (0.004) 
 
Intercept 0.500 (0.006) 
Year 2004 0.061 (0.007) 
 
Year 2004 0.052 (0.023) 
Year 2005 0.066 (0.007) 
 
Year 2005 0.051 (0.023) 
Year 2006 0.071 (0.007) 
 
Year 2006 0.011 (0.023) 
Year 2007 0.082 (0.007) 
 
Year 2007 0.023 (0.023) 
Grade 4 -0.070 (0.003) 
 
Grade 7 0.029 (0.006) 
Grade 5 -0.092 (0.003) 
 
Grade 8 0.039 (0.006) 
Threatened*Year 2004 0.020 (0.009) 
 
Threatened*Year 2004 0.019 (0.024) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.027 (0.009) 
 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.052 (0.024) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.035 (0.009) 
 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.071 (0.024) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.040 (0.009) 
 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.117 (0.024) 
 
Has NCLB Influenced Changes in Slack over Time? 
 As noted, there are two measures of efficiency in this dissertation: efficiency and slack. 
Unlike efficiency, where larger values indicate higher levels of efficiency, a larger value in slack 
actually implies a lower level of efficiency. When a school has a positive slack, even if its 
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efficiency equals one, it still does not operate at the truly efficient level. This dissertation focuses 
on slack in ADV that measures the percentage of advanced students a school should have 
achieved if it reached a truly efficient level. The investigation of the impact of NCLB on slack 
will shed some light on the issue that schools may focus on students at the margin of becoming 
proficient while ignoring those at the high and low ends. An increase of slack indicates there are 
too few advanced students, suggesting that higher-achieving students are ignored under the 
policy. The discussions of slack in this section are presented separately. 
   
Minnesota 
The trends in slack for third, fifth, and seventh grade are depicted in Figure 28 – 30. There 
was no substantial difference in slack between unthreatened and threatened schools; two groups 
only differed by no more than 6% in slack. Nonetheless, each grade had distinctive patterns of 
changes in slack over time. Grade 3 narrowed the gaps in slack for reading from 2001 to 2006 
and bounced back slightly in 2007, but continued to reduce those for math during the whole time 
period. With regard to fifth grade, it closed the gaps in slack for reading from 2001 to 2005, but 
widened again in 2006 and 2007. On the other hand, the gaps in math narrowed so substantially 
that there was no difference in slack for math between unthreatened and threatened schools in 
2006 and 2007. Seventh grade had a similar pattern in reading as fifth grade. However, 
unthreatened schools had more slack in math than in threatened schools in 2006 and 2007. 
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Figure 28, Trends in Slack, Grade 3, Minnesota 
 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year
Unthreatened Threatened
Reading
Trends in Slack for Grade 5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year
Unthreatened Threatened
Math
Trends in Slack for Grade 5
 
Figure 29, Trends in Slack, Grade 5, Minnesota 
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Figure 30, Trends in Slack, Grade 7, Minnesota 
 
Whether or not the changes in slack are caused by NCLB is investigated at the second-stage, 
whose results are presented in Table 10. The upper panel reports results for the elementary level 
and the lower panel results for the secondary level. The coefficients on year dummies in math at 
the elementary level are statistically significant, with the exception of 2003 and 2004, while 
those in reading are statistically significant only in 2004 and 2005. However, the coefficients on 
the interactions are negative and statistically significant from 2005 to 2007 in math and 2004 to 
2006 in reading, meaning that NCLB has reduced slack in math and reading after a few years of 
implementation. At the middle school level, the coefficients on year dummies are statistically 
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significant for both math and reading, except for reading in 2005. Unlike at the elementary level, 
NCLB has no impact on slack at the middle level.  
 Similar to the models whose dependent variable is efficiency, it is necessary to control for a 
confounding factor in the models whose dependent variable is slack. This confounding factor is 
the fact that more grades were tested from 2006. The results of the extended models that include 
a new variable – pct_highstakes, as well as its interaction with the threatened school dummy, are 
reported in the third and fourth column for math and the seventh and eighth column for reading 
in Table 10. The coefficients on two new variables for both elementary and middle school levels 
are not statistically significant and the inclusion of them in the models does not substantially 
change the coefficients on the interaction terms. This means that testing more grades does not 
greatly influence the changes of slack. 
 To sum up, NCLB has significantly reduced slack in math and reading after a few years of 
implementation at the elementary level, but not at the middle level. This to some extent implies 
that NCLB has not propelled schools to improve achievement for students in the middle group 
(proficient) at the expense of those at the high end (advanced). 
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Table 10, Coefficients from 2nd-stage Models, Model 1 and Model 2, Minnesota 
Using Slack in ADV as Dependent Variable 
 
Slack in Math Slack in Reading 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.095 (0.003) 0.089 (0.005) 0.118 (0.002) 0.102 (0.004) 
Year 2002 0.017 (0.007) 0.017 (0.007) 0.003 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) 
Year 2003 -0.016 (0.007) -0.016 (0.007) -0.007 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) 
Year 2004 -0.011 (0.007) -0.011 (0.007) -0.028 (0.006) -0.028 (0.006) 
Year 2005 -0.040 (0.007) -0.040 (0.007) -0.042 (0.006) -0.042 (0.006) 
Year 2006 0.097 (0.007) 0.092 (0.009) -0.015 (0.006) -0.017 (0.008) 
Year 2007 0.058 (0.007) 0.054 (0.009) 0.004 (0.006) 0.002 (0.008) 
Grade 4 0.017 (0.003) 0.018 (0.003) -0.010 (0.003) -0.009 (0.003) 
Grade 5 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.029 (0.002) -0.029 (0.002) 
Threatened*Year 2002 0.018 (0.008) 0.018 (0.008) -0.005 (0.007) -0.004 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2003 -0.003 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008) -0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2004 -0.002 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008) -0.010 (0.007) -0.011 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2005 -0.018 (0.008) -0.018 (0.008) -0.021 (0.007) -0.022 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2006 -0.036 (0.008) -0.038 (0.011) -0.013 (0.007) -0.029 (0.009) 
Threatened*Year 2007 -0.036 (0.008) -0.037 (0.011) -0.007 (0.007) -0.023 (0.009) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
0.016 (0.025) 
  
0.006 (0.022) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
0.006 (0.030) 
  
0.065 (0.026) 
         Middle Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.099 (0.007) 0.103 (0.010) 0.009 (0.006) 0.028 (0.009) 
Year 2005 -0.068 (0.018) -0.067 (0.018) -0.004 (0.017) -0.004 (0.017) 
Year 2006 -0.039 (0.015) -0.008 (0.042) 0.043 (0.014) 0.043 (0.040) 
Year 2007 -0.049 (0.015) -0.018 (0.042) 0.041 (0.014) 0.041 (0.040) 
Grade 7 0.082 (0.006) 0.082 (0.006) 0.121 (0.005) 0.121 (0.005) 
Grade 8 0.134 (0.006) 0.134 (0.006) 0.040 (0.005) 0.039 (0.005) 
Threatened*Year 2005 -0.022 (0.019) -0.022 (0.019) 0.001 (0.018) 0.002 (0.018) 
Threatened*Year 2006 -0.015 (0.015) -0.041 (0.044) -0.012 (0.015) 0.031 (0.043) 
Threatened*Year 2007 -0.012 (0.016) -0.037 (0.044) 0.001 (0.015) 0.044 (0.043) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
-0.058 (0.073) 
  
-0.001 (0.070) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
0.049 (0.079) 
  
-0.085 (0.075) 
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Indiana 
The trends in slack in ADV for math and reading for unthreatened and threatened schools are 
illustrated in Figures 31 – 33, which report the results of third, sixth, and eighth grade, 
respectively. The disparities in slack for third grade between unthreatened and threatened schools, 
for both math and reading, narrowed so substantially that they disappeared four years after 
NCLB was introduced. In sixth grade, the difference in slack stayed relatively stable from 2002 
to 2006 for reading, but decreased slightly from 3.7% in 2002 to 2.9% in 2006 for math. Unlike 
the other two grades, the gaps for both subjects in eighth grade increased over time. The increase 
in math was considerably larger than that for reading in eighth grade. 
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Figure 31, Trends in Slack, Grade 3, Indiana 
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Figure 32, Trends in Slack, Grade 6, Indiana 
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Figure 33, Trends in Slack, Grade 8, Indiana 
 
93 
 
 Next, results of the second stage models are reported in Table 11. The upper panel presents 
results of elementary schools and the lower one results of middle schools. At the elementary 
level most coefficients on year dummies, as well as those on the interactions, are not statistically 
significant, with the exception of year dummies for reading. Thus, there is no strong evidence 
that NCLB has had significant impact on the change of slack for math and reading at elementary 
schools. As far as the secondary level is concerned, unthreatened schools have lower slack in 
math but have no change in slack in reading after 2002. Furthermore, threatened middle schools 
differ significantly from unthreatened peers regarding the increased slack in math from 2002 to 
2006. The findings imply that NCLB has increased slack in middle schools. 
 Generally, NCLB has boosted slack in math at the middle school level, but not at the 
elementary school level. Furthermore, the policy has had no influence on slack in reading for 
both elementary and middle levels. 
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Table 11, Coefficients of School-Fixed Effect Models, Model 1 and Model 2, Indiana 
Using Slack in ADV as Dependent Variable, 
  
Slack in Math Slack in Reading 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Intercept 0.153 (0.004) 0.083 (0.003) 
 
Year 2003 0.017 (0.010) 0.011 (0.006) 
 
Year 2004 0.005 (0.010) 0.017 (0.006) 
 
Year 2005 0.014 (0.010) 0.029 (0.006) 
 
Year 2006 0.012 (0.010) 0.036 (0.006) 
 
Grade 4 0.048 (0.003) -0.068 (0.002) 
 
Grade 5 -0.059 (0.003) 0.086 (0.002) 
 
Threatened*Year 2003 -0.010 (0.011) 0.000 (0.007) 
 
Threatened*Year 2004 -0.013 (0.011) 0.001 (0.007) 
 
Threatened*Year 2005 -0.019 (0.011) -0.004 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2006 -0.022 (0.011) -0.008 (0.007) 
      Middle Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
 
Intercept 0.146 (0.004) 0.108 (0.002) 
 
Year 2003 -0.046 (0.010) 0.003 (0.006) 
 
Year 2004 -0.042 (0.010) 0.006 (0.006) 
 
Year 2005 -0.060 (0.010) 0.014 (0.006) 
 
Year 2006 -0.056 (0.010) 0.013 (0.006) 
 
Grade 7 0.110 (0.004) -0.036 (0.002) 
 
Grade 8 -0.092 (0.005) -0.072 (0.003) 
Threatened*Year 2003 0.026 (0.011) -0.004 (0.006) 
 
Threatened*Year 2004 0.021 (0.011) -0.004 (0.006) 
 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.024 (0.011) -0.008 (0.006) 
 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.025 (0.011) -0.005 (0.006) 
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South Carolina 
The trends in slack in ADV for grade 3 through 8 in South Carolina are depicted in Figures 
34 – 39. Third grade slightly increased the gap in slack in reading from 2001 to 2002, moved 
back to the previous level in the following years, and then increased again in 2006 and 2007. 
Furthermore, third grade also widened the gap in slack in science but closed that in social studies, 
though these changes were fairly small. The gap in slack in math increased over time for both 
fourth and fifth grade. Moreover, both fifth and eighth grade had more slack in social studies in 
2007 than in 2001. Nonetheless, all of the changes in slack were very small. Compared to other 
grades, sixth and seventh grade illustrated little change in the gap in slack for each tested subject. 
Therefore, the results imply that NCLB has had no effect on the changes of slack in South 
Carolina.  
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Figure 34, Trends in Slack, Grade 3, South Carolina 
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Figure 35, Trends in Slack, Grade 4, South Carolina 
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Figure 36, Trends in Slack, Grade 5, South Carolina 
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Figure 37, Trends in Slack, Grade 6, South Carolina 
 
98 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year 
Unthreatened Threatened
English
Trends in Slack for Grade 7
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year 
Unthreatened Threatened
Math
Trends in Slack for Grade 7
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year 
Unthreatened Threatened
Science
Trends in Slack for Grade 7
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year 
Unthreatened Threatened
Social Science
Trends in Slack for Grade 7
 
Figure 38, Trends in Slack, Grade 7, South Carolina 
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Figure 39, Trends in Slack, Grade 8, South Carolina 
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 Results of second-stage models using slack in ADV as dependent variable are reported in 
Table 12. At the elementary level, most coefficients on year dummies estimated from four 
models are statistically significant, but the signs and the effect sizes are different across models. 
Slack in math increased from 2002 to 2005 but slipped afterward for unthreatened elementary 
schools. The coefficients on the interactions are statistically significant for math, reading, and 
science. Unthreatened elementary schools have more slack in math and science than threatened 
counterparts in the NCLB years, but less slack in reading.  
 Results of middle schools are presented at the lower panel. Unthreatened middle schools 
have less slack in ADV in each tested subject over time. However, there is no significant 
difference in the change of slack between threatened and unthreatened middle schools. Thus, 
there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that NCLB has had an impact on slack in ADV for 
each tested subject at the middle school level. 
 In general, there is slightly more slack in math and in science but less slack in reading at the 
elementary level after NCLB was introduced, but no great change at the secondary level. 
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Table 12, Coefficients of School-Fixed Effect Models, Model 1 to Model 4, South Carolina 
Using Slack in ADV as Dependent Variable 
 
Slack in Math Slack in Reading Slack in Science Slack in Social Studies 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.185 (0.004) 0.205 (0.002) 0.300 (0.004) 0.331 (0.004) 
Year 2002 0.018 (0.009) 0.043 (0.005) 
    Year 2003 0.052 (0.009) 0.016 (0.005) 
    Year 2004 0.047 (0.009) 0.002 (0.005) -0.034 (0.008) 0.012 (0.008) 
Year 2005 0.050 (0.009) 0.021 (0.005) -0.051 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008) 
Year 2006 0.008 (0.009) 0.021 (0.005) -0.089 (0.008) -0.014 (0.008) 
Year 2007 0.002 (0.009) 0.040 (0.005) -0.077 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008) 
Grade 4 -0.013 (0.004) -0.095 (0.002) -0.104 (0.004) -0.076 (0.004) 
Grade 5 0.004 (0.004) -0.175 (0.002) -0.129 (0.004) -0.040 (0.004) 
Threatened*Year 2002 0.025 (0.011) -0.022 (0.006) 
    Threatened*Year 2003 0.020 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
    Threatened*Year 2004 0.013 (0.011) -0.006 (0.006) 0.022 (0.010) 0.002 (0.010) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.014 (0.011) -0.016 (0.006) 0.021 (0.010) 0.012 (0.010) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.038 (0.011) -0.021 (0.006) 0.030 (0.010) 0.010 (0.010) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.036 (0.011) -0.029 (0.006) 0.032 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010) 
         Middle Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.087 (0.002) 0.130 (0.002) 0.178 (0.003) 0.176 (0.003) 
Year 2002 -0.013 (0.010) -0.012 (0.009) 
    Year 2003 -0.031 (0.010) 0.014 (0.009) 
    Year 2004 -0.034 (0.010) 0.006 (0.009) -0.076 (0.010) -0.058 (0.012) 
Year 2005 -0.024 (0.010) -0.006 (0.009) -0.092 (0.010) -0.046 (0.012) 
Year 2006 -0.031 (0.010) -0.003 (0.009) -0.075 (0.010) -0.053 (0.012) 
Year 2007 -0.033 (0.010) 0.001 (0.009) -0.082 (0.010) -0.023 (0.012) 
Grade 7 -0.006 (0.002) -0.076 (0.002) -0.057 (0.003) -0.086 (0.003) 
Grade 8 -0.012 (0.002) -0.071 (0.002) -0.044 (0.003) -0.091 (0.003) 
Threatened*Year 2002 0.006 (0.010) 0.003 (0.009) 
    Threatened*Year 2003 0.014 (0.010) -0.008 (0.010) 
    Threatened*Year 2004 0.007 (0.010) -0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.011) 0.021 (0.013) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.001 (0.010) -0.005 (0.010) 0.022 (0.011) 0.011 (0.013) 
Threatened*Year 2006 -0.001 (0.010) -0.009 (0.010) 0.013 (0.011) 0.016 (0.013) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.005 (0.010) -0.008 (0.010) 0.016 (0.011) 0.005 (0.013) 
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Sensitivity Analysis to DEA results 
DEA estimates are sensitive to outliers, which could push the frontier outward. If these 
outliers are characterized by high levels of measurement error, efficiency of the schools inside 
the frontier could be underestimated. Excluding schools with extreme scores from DEA models 
may result in different efficiency estimates. We explore this possibility with two types of 
sensitivity analysis of first stage results. 
 The first type of sensitivity analysis is conducted in the following steps. First, the DEA 
models are run including all schools. After obtaining efficiency estimates, all efficient schools 
(efficiency estimates = 1) are excluded from the dataset and the DEA models are run again. The 
efficiency estimates from the first step and those from the second step are then compared. The 
correlations between two sets of efficiency are presented in Table 13. The correlations between 
two sets of the efficiency measures are fairly high across three states, suggesting the DEA results 
are not unduly influenced by extreme outliers. 
 
Table 13, Correlations between Efficiency Estimates from the First Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Minnesota Indiana 
South 
Carolina 
Minnesota Indiana 
South 
Carolina 
Grade 3 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.96 
Grade 4 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.86 0.94 0.94 
Grade 5 0.98 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.95 0.93 
Grade 6 0.95 0.95 0.89 0.96 0.94 0.92 
Grade 7 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.88 
Grade 8 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.91 0.91 
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The second type of sensitivity analysis is conducted using Hadi method (Hadi, 1992, 1994). 
According to Hadi (1992, 1994), the outliers in a dataset can be identified in the following steps. 
First, the whole dataset is sorted in ascending order and then divided into two parts. The first part 
of the dataset is treated as the basic subset and considered to be free of outliers. The other part of 
the dataset is non-basic subset which is believed to contain outliers, as outliers tend to be sorted 
at the end of the whole dataset. Next, the distance from each observation in the whole dataset to 
the center of the basic subset is calculated. Then, a T-test will be conducted on the calculated 
distances. The observations whose distances are larger than the critical value will be considered 
as outliers. Thus, the second sensitivity analysis in this dissertation is conducted by first using 
Hadi method to identify and exclude outliers from the whole sample, after which DEA models 
are run with the new sample. Next, efficiency estimates from the original models and the new 
models are correlated. The results are reported in Table 14. The correlations between two sets of 
efficiency estimates are considerably high, implying that DEA results are not driven by outliers. 
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Table 14, Correlations between Efficiency Estimates from the Second Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Minnesota Indiana 
South 
Carolina 
Minnesota Indiana 
South 
Carolina 
Grade 3 1.000 0.999 0.988 0.999 0.999 0.995 
Grade 4 0.999 0.999 0.980 0.997 0.999 0.982 
Grade 5 1.000 0.999 0.984 1.000 0.993 0.853 
Grade 6 0.998 1.000 0.974 0.995 0.998 0.930 
Grade 7 1.000 0.995 0.970 0.998 0.998 0.926 
Grade 8 0.998 0.982 0.968 0.995 0.969 0.957 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation investigated the effect of NCLB on school efficiency using two stage 
analyses. At the first stage, school efficiency, measured by efficiency and slack, was estimated 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). At the second stage, a difference-in-differences 
estimator was used to examine the effect of NCLB on school efficiency. This dissertation 
analyzed school level data from three states: Minnesota, Indiana, and South Carolina. Key 
findings, implications for education policy, and limitations of this study are summarized in the 
following sections. 
 
Findings and Policy Implications 
There is consistent evidence to suggest that public schools in the United States do not 
efficiently utilize resources to produce educational outcomes. The average efficiency for schools 
in Minnesota and Indiana is no more than .78, which suggests that without using more inputs, 
schools should have produced 22% more outputs if they operated at the optimal level. Relative to 
Minnesota and Indiana, South Carolina has a much lower average efficiency, no more than .46. 
This implies that schools in South Carolina only produced half of the output they could have 
produced were they operated efficiently. One possible reason for the extremely low efficiency is 
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that South Carolina has the most difficult proficiency standards in the nation (Cronin, et al. 2007), 
which results in fewer students reaching advanced level in the assessments. 
This investigation also found that despite the existence of inefficiency, public schools have 
increased their efficiency level over time. There is no consistent pattern in terms of the change of 
average efficiency across grades for each state. Some grades have improved efficiency steadily 
over time (such as third grade in Minnesota and sixth grade in Indiana), while others have gone 
up and down during the same time period. No matter what the pattern is, the overall trend is that 
efficiency is eventually improved since NCLB was introduced. Additionally, my research shows 
that, on average, unthreatened schools have a higher efficiency level than threatened peers in 
each state. 
There is evidence that NCLB has had a positive effect on school efficiency. This dissertation 
found that NCLB has had a positive effect on school efficiency for both Minnesota and Indiana, 
but a small effect for South Carolina. In Minnesota and Indiana schools that face little sanctions 
of NCLB stay relatively stable in terms of the change of efficiency while the ones that are under 
pressure of being sanctioned have substantially improved efficiency over time. Compared to the 
former two states, the effect of NCLB on efficiency has been much smaller in South Carolina. 
South Carolina schools that are threatened by NCLB sanctions differ only slightly from 
unthreatened schools with respect to trends in efficiency in math and reading. There are greater 
differences in science and social studies. As discussed, South Carolina has the most difficult 
proficiency standards in the whole nation, resulting in a low percentage of advanced students in 
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the assessments. Therefore, it is very likely that all schools, including the ones facing and not 
facing sanctions, respond significantly to NCLB, which subsequently results in subtle effects of 
the policy on efficiency.  
Using our second measure of efficiency, slack, we find mixed evidence for the hypothesis 
that NCLB has resulted in increased slack in school performance. In Minnesota NCLB has 
reduced slack, suggesting that the policy has made schools in the state become more efficient. On 
the other hand, the policy has boosted slack in Indiana, meaning that middle schools have 
become less efficient after NCLB was introduced. With regard to South Carolina, slack in math 
and science increased while slack in reading reduced after NCLB was implemented. In addition, 
NCLB has had no impact on slack in social studies in South Carolina. 
The findings that threatened schools responded positively to NCLB by increasing their 
efficiency level are encouraging. In order to reach Annual Measurable Objectives (AMO) and 
make AYP, schools need to produce more proficient students each year, which can be 
accomplished by either investing more inputs or improving efficiency level. However, given the 
fact that federal funding is limited and local authorities need to cover some part of the costs 
related to implementing NCLB (Center on Education Policy, 2006), it is less likely that more 
inputs will be provided to schools. Therefore, it is necessary that schools, especially the ones at 
risk of not making AYP, need to improve their efficiency level so that more outputs can be 
achieved with limited resources. The results of our study suggest that the pressure from NCLB 
does make schools better utilize their current resources. 
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Additionally, the implementation of DEA in this dissertation provides an alternative tool to 
evaluate school performance. Generally, schools are evaluated based on their effectiveness in 
producing educational outcomes, that is, whether they reach certain thresholds. This type of 
evaluation only focuses on outputs, without considering the amount of needed inputs. Thus, it is 
to some extent incomplete as certain effective schools may have more inputs than ineffective 
ones and the difference in the inputs is the reason for the effectiveness. To solve this problem, it 
is necessary to take into account inputs when school performances are evaluated, as efficiency 
studies have done. As a result, efficiency and effectiveness studies together will construct a 
complete picture of school performance as schools can be classified into one of the four groups: 
(1) effective and efficient, (2) effective and inefficient, (3) ineffective and efficient, or (4) 
ineffective and inefficient.  
This classification of schools will give decision makers some guidance when considering 
resource allocation among schools. The first group of schools is the perfect scenario as they have 
reached the threshold and utilized resources to the maximal level. The second group of schools 
has reached the threshold, but not utilized resources to full potential, implying that they have 
more resources than necessary. Thus, it is possible to reduce resources and increase efficiency 
level for those schools. The third group has used resources wisely, but has not reached the 
threshold. Thus, the solution is to increase the amount of resources for this group of schools. In 
terms of the last group of schools, they are the ones who need most assistance: they need to have 
more resources and to increase efficiency simultaneously. 
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On the whole, the evaluation of school performance that contains both efficiency and 
effectiveness will provide a good tool for decision makers to better allocate resources among 
schools. By classifying schools into different groups, resources can be targeted toward the 
neediest schools which in turn will improve student achievement.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are three limitations in this dissertation. First, this dissertation assumes a black box 
model of production, which gives no insights on what kinds of resource allocation decisions are 
made and how within schools. Because of this assumption, it is impossible to differentiate 
allocative efficiency from technical efficiency. Thus, it is not easy to provide specific 
recommendations on how to reallocate resources within schools so that higher level of efficiency 
can be achieved. To overcome this, future research is needed that will include more detailed 
information.  
Specifically, the future research could ask what kinds of strategies schools employed to 
improve student test performance, such as: (1) do schools provide incentives for teachers to 
improve their performance, (2) do schools provide professional development activities for 
teachers, (3) do schools reduce class size, or (4) do schools provide aids or mentors for teachers. 
Then it would be possible to get an understanding on whether or not those strategies have 
significant effects on the improvement of allocative and technical efficiency, which could 
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subsequently provide explicit recommendations for schools to better utilize and allocate their 
resources. 
The second limitation is that this dissertation may not capture the full effects of NCLB. As 
discussed, the NCLB effect is identified by using difference-in-differences estimation which is 
constructed by classifying schools into unthreatened or threatened. The difference-in-differences 
estimator will capture the full effect of NCLB if unthreatened schools do not respond to 
sanctions of the policy, but will only capture a partial effect if they respond. The literature 
indicated that many empirical studies focus on responses of low-performing schools, or 
threatened schools as called in this dissertation, toward sanctions of NCLB (Figlio & Rouse, 
2006), but not on responses of high-performing ones. Therefore, in reality it is unclear whether 
unthreatened schools are influenced by the policy. As a result, another possible direction for 
future research is to empirically investigate the responses of high-performing schools toward 
sanctions of NCLB. In turn, this will provide insights on the validity of the assumption that 
unthreatened schools did not change their behaviors after NCLB was implemented. 
Finally, results from the three states are incomparable in this dissertation. Although it is 
found that the average efficiencies for schools in Minnesota and Indiana (around .78) are higher 
than those in South Carolina (about .40), we cannot conclude that schools in the former two 
states are more efficient than those in the latter state in utilizing resources. The reason is that 
each state has its own assessment systems and distinct proficiency standards, which makes it 
meaningless to compare test performance across states. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the 
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efficiency level across states with different standards and assessments. One possible direction for 
future research is to use national assessments, such as NAEP, so that evaluations of school 
performances across states are comparable.  
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Appendix A 
 
Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) and Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) Models 
 
 The basic CCR model assumes Constant Returns to Scale (CRS), which suggests that DMUs 
can linearly scale up inputs and outputs without decreasing or increasing efficiency (Anderson, 
1996). If this assumption holds, then all DMUs are operating at an optimal scale. If CRS does not 
hold, then choice of scale affects the relationship between inputs and outputs. Estimating the 
efficiency frontier under a CRS assumption when return to scale is variable can confound scale 
effects with efficiency. Therefore, Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) models are constructed to 
differentiate pure technical efficiency from scale efficiency. These two models are depicted in the 
following graph. 
 Let’s suppose there are five DMUs, A, B, C, D, and E, who produce one output Y using one 
input X. Under the CRS model, the frontier line is the line OA, meaning that A is the only DMU 
that is efficient. However, the VRS model takes into account the possibility that DMUs have 
increasing returns to scale (such as B and D in this example) or decreasing returns to scale (such 
as C and E in this example). As a result, under the VRS model, the frontier line is constructed by 
the linear combination of B, A, and C, suggesting that these three DMUs are efficient. 
Additionally, inefficiency levels for D and E are less in the VRS model than in the CRS model. 
To conclude, under the circumstance that not all DMUs are operating at the optimal scale, 
using the VRS model can yield a more accurate measure of technical efficiency. 
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Appendix B 
  
AYP Status by School Type, Year, Subject 
 
 
Table B.1  Minnesota 
  Math Reading 
  Unthreatened Threatened Unthreatened Threatened 
2003 Made AYP 160 745 160 749 
Not Made AYP  13  9 
2004 Made AYP 162 747 162 740 
Not Made AYP  36  43 
2005 Made AYP 159 776 159 774 
Not Made AYP  5  7 
2006 Made AYP 155 746 155 760 
Not Made AYP  27  13 
2007 Made AYP 153 739 153 737 
Not Made AYP  39  41 
 
Table B.2  Indiana 
  Math Reading 
  Unthreatened Threatened Unthreatened Threatened 
2003 Made AYP 306 1406 306 1388 
Not Made AYP  54  72 
2004 Made AYP 301 1413 301 1394 
Not Made AYP  80  99 
2005 Made AYP 301 1406 300 1352 
Not Made AYP  97 1 151 
2006 Made AYP 298 1405 298 1356 
Not Made AYP  102  151 
 
 
Table B.3  South Carolina 
  Math Reading 
  Unthreatened Threatened Unthreatened Threatened 
2003 Made AYP 252 445 252 420 
Not Made AYP 2 152 2 177 
2004 Made AYP 251 584 251 575 
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Not Made AYP  24  33 
2005 Made AYP 245 517 246 509 
Not Made AYP 2 96 1 104 
2006 Made AYP 248 526 245 495 
Not Made AYP 1 96 4 127 
2007 Made AYP 243 473 242 448 
Not Made AYP 3 161 4 186 
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Appendix C 
 
Mean Efficiency by Grade, Year, School Type, Model 1 and Model 2 
 
 
Table C.1  Minnesota 
C.1a, Efficiency in Math (Model 1) 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened  0.826 0.806 0.833 0.815 0.870 0.868 0.859 0.840 
  Threatened 0.635 0.622 0.703 0.690 0.767 0.758 0.767 0.706 
Grade 4 Unthreatened  
     
0.800 0.794 0.797 
  Threatened 
     
0.682 0.695 0.688 
Grade 5 Unthreatened  0.824 0.848 0.861 0.851 0.888 0.738 0.775 0.826 
  Threatened 0.649 0.679 0.735 0.721 0.806 0.611 0.658 0.694 
Grade 6 Unthreatened  
     
0.732 0.758 0.745 
  Threatened 
     
0.612 0.660 0.636 
Grade 7 Unthreatened  
   
0.850 0.859 0.755 0.770 0.808 
  Threatened 
   
0.695 0.820 0.630 0.674 0.705 
Grade 8 Unthreatened  
     
0.713 0.703 0.708 
  Threatened 
     
0.630 0.622 0.626 
  
      
    
C.1b, Efficiency in Reading (Model 2) 
    2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened  0.825 0.811 0.840 0.836 0.875 0.894 0.881 0.852 
  Threatened 0.657 0.644 0.710 0.722 0.774 0.803 0.783 0.728 
Grade 4 unthreatened 
     
0.852 0.809 0.830 
  Threatened 
     
0.769 0.719 0.744 
Grade 5 Unthreatened  0.869 0.880 0.871 0.857 0.894 0.853 0.832 0.865 
  Threatened 0.728 0.731 0.756 0.739 0.811 0.762 0.728 0.751 
Grade 6 Unthreatened  
     
0.816 0.786 0.801 
  Threatened 
     
0.745 0.710 0.728 
Grade 7 Unthreatened  
   
0.879 0.882 0.823 0.783 0.842 
  Threatened 
   
0.745 0.811 0.732 0.685 0.743 
Grade 8 Unthreatened  
     
0.756 0.766 0.761 
  Threatened 
     
0.722 0.686 0.704 
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Table C.2  Indiana 
C.2a, Efficiency in Math (Model 1) 
    
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened 0.847 0.836 0.826 0.816 0.798 0.824 
 
Threatened 0.710 0.730 0.731 0.724 0.708 0.721 
Grade 4 Unthreatened 
 
0.750 0.741 0.736 0.726 0.738 
 
Threatened 
 
0.658 0.668 0.670 0.685 0.670 
Grade 5 Unthreatened 
 
0.802 0.821 0.825 0.818 0.817 
 
Threatened 
 
0.713 0.739 0.743 0.758 0.738 
Grade 6 Unthreatened 0.860 0.845 0.862 0.885 0.877 0.866 
 
Threatened 0.712 0.739 0.774 0.798 0.806 0.766 
Grade 7 Unthreatened 
 
0.853 0.841 0.841 0.863 0.849 
 
Threatened 
 
0.744 0.762 0.780 0.792 0.769 
Grade 8 Unthreatened 0.892 0.878 0.871 0.865 0.888 0.879 
 
Threatened 0.768 0.773 0.774 0.769 0.804 0.778 
        C.2b, Efficiency in Reading (Model 2) 
    
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened 0.878 0.871 0.844 0.846 0.851 0.858 
 
Threatened 0.750 0.765 0.758 0.752 0.778 0.761 
Grade 4 Unthreatened 
 
0.863 0.851 0.855 0.841 0.852 
 
Threatened 
 
0.746 0.752 0.771 0.766 0.758 
Grade 5 Unthreatened 
 
0.839 0.848 0.857 0.847 0.847 
 
Threatened 
 
0.744 0.754 0.775 0.783 0.764 
Grade 6 Unthreatened 0.841 0.825 0.816 0.825 0.821 0.826 
 
Threatened 0.697 0.711 0.718 0.721 0.735 0.716 
Grade 7 Unthreatened 
 
0.837 0.796 0.790 0.817 0.810 
 
Threatened 
 
0.731 0.723 0.719 0.749 0.731 
Grade 8 Unthreatened 0.878 0.862 0.839 0.838 0.839 0.851 
 
Threatened 0.728 0.755 0.749 0.750 0.765 0.749 
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C.3  South Carolina 
C.3a, Efficiency in Math (Model 1) 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened 0.540 0.477 0.500 0.439 0.438 0.488 0.431 0.473 
  Threatened 0.343 0.298 0.315 0.293 0.292 0.326 0.281 0.307 
Grade 4 Unthreatened 0.439 0.546 0.503 0.516 0.551 0.558 0.555 0.524 
  Threatened 0.253 0.328 0.317 0.343 0.394 0.380 0.388 0.343 
Grade 5 Unthreatened 0.512 0.507 0.481 0.537 0.512 0.515 0.503 0.510 
  Threatened 0.288 0.271 0.253 0.317 0.317 0.320 0.307 0.296 
Grade 6 Unthreatened 0.517 0.537 0.621 0.624 0.645 0.618 0.617 0.597 
  Threatened 0.277 0.292 0.386 0.399 0.405 0.376 0.384 0.360 
Grade 7 Unthreatened 0.672 0.659 0.655 0.697 0.712 0.669 0.680 0.678 
  Threatened 0.384 0.381 0.428 0.465 0.490 0.461 0.467 0.439 
Grade 8 Unthreatened 0.619 0.619 0.573 0.646 0.603 0.585 0.493 0.591 
  Threatened 0.311 0.325 0.330 0.380 0.409 0.402 0.341 0.357 
          C.3b, Efficiency in Reading (Model 2) 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened 0.587 0.562 0.601 0.695 0.691 0.666 0.659 0.637 
  Threatened 0.402 0.366 0.407 0.542 0.530 0.495 0.490 0.462 
Grade 4 Unthreatened 0.589 0.512 0.485 0.553 0.505 0.569 0.570 0.540 
  Threatened 0.392 0.323 0.309 0.388 0.365 0.406 0.419 0.372 
Grade 5 Unthreatened 0.531 0.464 0.391 0.486 0.512 0.575 0.510 0.496 
  Threatened 0.323 0.258 0.203 0.297 0.318 0.372 0.330 0.300 
Grade 6 Unthreatened 0.572 0.604 0.509 0.553 0.520 0.564 0.571 0.556 
  Threatened 0.387 0.407 0.330 0.343 0.329 0.372 0.376 0.363 
Grade 7 Unthreatened 0.720 0.686 0.596 0.641 0.662 0.632 0.643 0.654 
  Threatened 0.493 0.423 0.368 0.405 0.377 0.403 0.451 0.417 
Grade 8 Unthreatened 0.644 0.694 0.530 0.664 0.696 0.608 0.593 0.633 
  Threatened 0.402 0.452 0.329 0.445 0.517 0.422 0.411 0.425 
          C.3c, Efficiency in Science (Model 3 for South Carolina) 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened 
  
0.420 0.381 0.413 0.395 0.452 0.412 
  Threatened   0.202 0.201 0.228 0.211 0.267 0.222 
Grade 4 Unthreatened 
  
0.414 0.495 0.488 0.531 0.568 0.499 
  Threatened   0.226 0.275 0.312 0.322 0.368 0.301 
Grade 5 Unthreatened 
  
0.433 0.476 0.509 0.480 0.532 0.486 
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  Threatened     0.222 0.259 0.287 0.277 0.338 0.277 
Grade 6 Unthreatened 
  
0.462 0.605 0.611 0.532 0.649 0.572 
  Threatened   0.257 0.361 0.391 0.315 0.434 0.352 
Grade 7 Unthreatened 
  
0.544 0.653 0.638 0.643 0.702 0.636 
  Threatened   0.325 0.451 0.450 0.443 0.554 0.445 
Grade 8 Unthreatened 
  
0.530 0.603 0.661 0.585 0.634 0.603 
  Threatened   0.311 0.356 0.451 0.415 0.533 0.413 
          C.3d, Efficiency in Social Studies (Model 4 for South Carolina) 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Unthreatened 
  
0.382 0.397 0.517 0.569 0.597 0.492 
  Threatened   0.161 0.226 0.289 0.337 0.370 0.277 
Grade 4 Unthreatened 
  
0.362 0.479 0.485 0.508 0.533 0.474 
  Threatened   0.169 0.258 0.296 0.299 0.325 0.269 
Grade 5 Unthreatened 
  
0.382 0.432 0.456 0.432 0.466 0.433 
  Threatened   0.198 0.236 0.261 0.232 0.304 0.246 
Grade 6 Unthreatened 
  
0.356 0.535 0.552 0.578 0.646 0.533 
  Threatened   0.184 0.302 0.345 0.331 0.411 0.315 
Grade 7 Unthreatened 
  
0.601 0.712 0.740 0.597 0.668 0.663 
  Threatened   0.353 0.417 0.438 0.387 0.480 0.415 
Grade 8 Unthreatened 
  
0.603 0.755 0.699 0.633 0.411 0.620 
  Threatened   0.362 0.487 0.496 0.469 0.318 0.426 
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Appendix D 
 
Mean Slack by Grade, Year, Model 1 and Model 2 
 
Table D.1 Minnesota 
D.1a, Slack in ADV in Math (Model 1) 
     
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.038 0.063 0.028 0.025 0.009 0.26 0.237 0.094 
Grade 4 
     
0.167 0.128 0.148 
Grade 5 0.11 0.106 0.066 0.071 0.028 0.445 0.371 0.171 
Grade 6 
     
0.067 0.057 0.062 
Grade 7 
   
0.173 0.086 0.252 0.208 0.18 
Grade 8 
     
0.159 0.178 0.169 
        D.1b, Slack in ADV in Reading (Model 2) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.119 0.12 0.083 0.046 0.039 0.156 0.212 0.111 
Grade 4 
     
0.107 0.124 0.116 
Grade 5 0.036 0.036 0.048 0.041 0.016 0.353 0.355 0.126 
Grade 6 
     
0.068 0.087 0.078 
Grade 7 
   
0.167 0.161 0.18 0.214 0.181 
Grade 8 
     
0.11 0.07 0.09 
 
120 
 
Table D.2 Indiana 
D.2a, Slack in ADV in Math (Model 1) 
   
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 0.154 0.151 0.150 0.146 0.166 0.153 
Grade 4 
 
0.215 0.199 0.210 0.178 0.200 
Grade 5 
 
0.111 0.087 0.089 0.087 0.093 
Grade 6 0.144 0.118 0.095 0.077 0.077 0.102 
Grade 7 
 
0.222 0.241 0.221 0.232 0.229 
Grade 8 0.058 0.060 0.087 0.083 0.075 0.073 
       D.2b, Slack in ADV in Reading (Model 2) 
   
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 0.085 0.096 0.098 0.118 0.107 0.101 
Grade 4 
 
0.031 0.033 0.037 0.042 0.036 
Grade 5 
 
0.175 0.190 0.191 0.205 0.190 
Grade 6 0.104 0.103 0.102 0.113 0.117 0.108 
Grade 7 
 
0.074 0.081 0.076 0.068 0.075 
Grade 8 0.051 0.048 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.053 
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Table D.3 South Carolina 
D.3a, Slack in ADV in Math (Model 1) 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.120 0.205 0.222 0.272 0.257 0.238 0.233 0.221 
Grade 4 0.229 0.195 0.219 0.209 0.256 0.197 0.173 0.211 
Grade 5 0.200 0.249 0.303 0.230 0.207 0.207 0.214 0.230 
Grade 6 0.083 0.089 0.060 0.059 0.074 0.056 0.062 0.069 
Grade 7 0.086 0.068 0.066 0.052 0.047 0.058 0.042 0.060 
Grade 8 0.071 0.058 0.063 0.045 0.052 0.033 0.051 0.054 
         D.3b, Slack in ADV in Reading (Model 2) 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 0.196 0.253 0.206 0.175 0.211 0.222 0.241 0.215 
Grade 4 0.102 0.132 0.119 0.122 0.126 0.117 0.127 0.121 
Grade 5 0.046 0.044 0.054 0.042 0.039 0.028 0.037 0.041 
Grade 6 0.124 0.116 0.128 0.134 0.124 0.101 0.122 0.121 
Grade 7 0.052 0.049 0.065 0.045 0.051 0.048 0.046 0.051 
Grade 8 0.069 0.048 0.073 0.051 0.037 0.062 0.057 0.057 
         D.3c, Slack in ADV in Science (Model 3 for South Carolina) 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 
  
0.268 0.266 0.287 0.239 0.259 0.264 
Grade 4 
  
0.218 0.165 0.159 0.128 0.131 0.160 
Grade 5 
  
0.188 0.179 0.111 0.095 0.102 0.135 
Grade 6 
  
0.195 0.121 0.103 0.126 0.101 0.129 
Grade 7 
  
0.112 0.062 0.043 0.064 0.054 0.067 
Grade 8 
  
0.122 0.083 0.071 0.052 0.075 0.081 
         D.3d, Slack in ADV in Social Studies (Model 4 for South Carolina) 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 
  
0.322 0.370 0.293 0.336 0.331 0.330 
Grade 4 
  
0.258 0.247 0.291 0.258 0.231 0.257 
Grade 5 
  
0.303 0.300 0.313 0.264 0.292 0.294 
Grade 6 
  
0.199 0.129 0.125 0.133 0.163 0.150 
Grade 7 
  
0.090 0.067 0.076 0.044 0.040 0.064 
Grade 8 
  
0.059 0.038 0.045 0.062 0.088 0.058 
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Appendix E 
 
Mean Efficiency by Grade, Year, School Type, Model 3 and Model 4 
 
E.1, Minnesota 
E.1a, Efficiency (Model 3) 
       
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.707 0.695 0.751 0.752 0.802 0.828 0.822 0.765 
 
Unthreatened 0.858 0.823 0.855 0.836 0.880 0.893 0.891 0.862 
 
Threatened 0.682 0.675 0.734 0.738 0.790 0.817 0.811 0.749 
Grade 4 Total 
     
0.804 0.780 0.792 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.870 0.846 0.858 
 
Threatened 
     
0.797 0.772 0.785 
Grade 5 Total 0.759 0.773 0.798 0.787 0.848 0.769 0.744 0.782 
 
Unthreatened 0.894 0.882 0.889 0.863 0.914 0.842 0.824 0.872 
 
Threatened 0.735 0.754 0.782 0.773 0.837 0.755 0.730 0.767 
Grade 6 Total 
     
0.765 0.752 0.758 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.818 0.810 0.814 
 
Threatened 
     
0.756 0.744 0.750 
Grade 7 Total 
   
0.753 0.835 0.702 0.680 0.742 
 
Unthreatened 
   
0.874 0.895 0.786 0.780 0.834 
 
Threatened 
   
0.739 0.829 0.691 0.668 0.732 
Grade 8 Total 
     
0.744 0.725 0.735 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.754 0.774 0.764 
 
Threatened 
     
0.746 0.721 0.733 
          E.1b, Efficiency (Model 4) 
       
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.721 0.706 0.765 0.767 0.823 0.831 0.825 0.777 
 
Unthreatened 0.868 0.829 0.862 0.843 0.891 0.893 0.891 0.868 
 
Threatened 0.692 0.681 0.746 0.750 0.810 0.817 0.811 0.758 
Grade 4 Total 
     
0.816 0.790 0.803 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.871 0.851 0.861 
 
Threatened 
     
0.803 0.777 0.790 
Grade 5 Total 0.765 0.779 0.803 0.792 0.858 0.770 0.746 0.788 
 
Unthreatened 0.895 0.885 0.890 0.865 0.916 0.842 0.824 0.874 
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Threatened 0.740 0.758 0.785 0.777 0.846 0.756 0.730 0.770 
Grade 6 Total 
     
0.784 0.772 0.778 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.828 0.826 0.827 
 
Threatened 
     
0.775 0.764 0.770 
Grade 7 Total 
   
0.757 0.845 0.707 0.683 0.748 
 
Unthreatened 
   
0.877 0.893 0.792 0.784 0.837 
 
Threatened 
   
0.743 0.839 0.697 0.672 0.738 
Grade 8 Total 
     
0.752 0.738 0.745 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.736 0.776 0.756 
 
Threatened 
     
0.755 0.733 0.744 
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E.2, Indiana 
E.2a, Efficiency (Model 3) 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.799 0.811 0.800 0.795 0.807 0.802 
 
Unthreatened 0.891 0.885 0.864 0.862 0.860 0.872 
 
Threatened 0.773 0.789 0.781 0.775 0.792 0.782 
Grade 4 Total 
 
0.802 0.808 0.815 0.818 0.811 
 
Unthreatened 
 
0.882 0.876 0.875 0.865 0.875 
 
Threatened 
 
0.779 0.789 0.798 0.805 0.793 
Grade 5 Total 
 
0.797 0.815 0.826 0.832 0.818 
 
Unthreatened 
 
0.866 0.884 0.888 0.878 0.879 
 
Threatened 
 
0.777 0.796 0.809 0.820 0.800 
Grade 6 Total 0.772 0.790 0.807 0.826 0.832 0.805 
 
Unthreatened 0.882 0.872 0.876 0.895 0.886 0.882 
 
Threatened 0.745 0.770 0.790 0.809 0.820 0.787 
Grade 7 Total 
 
0.798 0.802 0.812 0.826 0.810 
 
Unthreatened 
 
0.883 0.863 0.860 0.879 0.871 
 
Threatened 
 
0.782 0.791 0.804 0.818 0.799 
Grade 8 Total 0.792 0.798 0.795 0.793 0.823 0.800 
 
Unthreatened 0.910 0.889 0.877 0.880 0.893 0.890 
 
Threatened 0.783 0.791 0.789 0.787 0.818 0.794 
        E.2b, Efficiency (Model 4) 
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.804 0.813 0.802 0.796 0.808 0.805 
 
Unthreatened 0.896 0.888 0.865 0.864 0.861 0.875 
 
Threatened 0.777 0.791 0.784 0.777 0.793 0.784 
Grade 4 Total 
 
0.805 0.812 0.819 0.821 0.814 
 
Unthreatened 
 
0.886 0.880 0.878 0.869 0.878 
 
Threatened 
 
0.781 0.792 0.802 0.808 0.796 
Grade 5 Total 
 
0.799 0.817 0.828 0.834 0.820 
 
Unthreatened 
 
0.868 0.886 0.889 0.878 0.880 
 
Threatened 
 
0.779 0.798 0.811 0.821 0.802 
Grade 6 Total 0.773 0.791 0.808 0.828 0.834 0.807 
 
Unthreatened 0.883 0.873 0.877 0.896 0.887 0.883 
 
Threatened 0.746 0.771 0.792 0.811 0.821 0.788 
Grade 7 Total 
 
0.801 0.804 0.815 0.829 0.813 
 
Unthreatened 
 
0.888 0.867 0.865 0.882 0.876 
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Threatened 
 
0.785 0.793 0.806 0.821 0.801 
Grade 8 Total 0.796 0.803 0.799 0.797 0.826 0.804 
 
Unthreatened 0.915 0.895 0.883 0.883 0.897 0.895 
 
Threatened 0.787 0.796 0.793 0.791 0.821 0.798 
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Appendix F 
 
Mean Slack by Grade, Year, School Type, Model 3 and Model 4 
 
F.1, Minnesota 
F.1a, Slack in math (Model 3) 
        
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.031 0.029 0.019 0.031 0.015 0.022 0.016 0.023 
 
Unthreatened 0.008 0.017 0.013 0.019 0.008 0.011 0.005 0.012 
 
Threatened 0.039 0.034 0.022 0.034 0.017 0.025 0.019 0.027 
Grade 4 Total 
     
0.028 0.023 0.026 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.021 0.014 0.017 
 
Threatened 
     
0.022 0.020 0.021 
Grade 5 Total 0.054 0.041 0.019 0.019 0.011 0.134 0.088 0.052 
 
Unthreatened 0.016 0.021 0.009 0.010 0.003 0.079 0.056 0.028 
 
Threatened 0.061 0.044 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.142 0.093 0.056 
Grade 6 Total 
     
0.062 0.044 0.053 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.054 0.032 0.043 
 
Threatened 
     
0.063 0.046 0.055 
Grade 7 Total 
   
0.040 0.018 0.100 0.056 0.054 
 
Unthreatened 
   
0.015 0.022 0.072 0.049 0.039 
 
Threatened 
   
0.043 0.018 0.104 0.057 0.056 
Grade 8 Total 
     
0.069 0.058 0.064 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.095 0.035 0.065 
 
Threatened 
     
0.064 0.061 0.062 
         
  
F.1b, Slack in reading (Model 3) 
      
  
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.011 0.012 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.006 
 
Unthreatened 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 
 
Threatened 0.014 0.015 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.008 
Grade 4 Total 
     
0.001 0.003 0.002 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.002 0.000 0.001 
 
Threatened 
     
0.002 0.003 0.003 
Grade 5 Total 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.006 
 
Unthreatened 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.003 
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Threatened 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.008 
Grade 6 Total 
     
0.002 0.008 0.005 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.000 0.003 0.002 
 
Threatened 
     
0.002 0.009 0.006 
Grade 7 Total 
   
0.004 0.013 0.003 0.012 0.008 
 
Unthreatened 
   
0.008 0.012 0.002 0.013 0.009 
 
Threatened 
   
0.003 0.013 0.003 0.011 0.008 
Grade 8 Total 
     
0.007 0.007 0.007 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.014 0.006 0.010 
 
Threatened 
     
0.006 0.008 0.007 
          F.1c, Slack in math (Model 4) 
        
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.050 0.083 0.050 0.051 0.028 0.314 0.296 0.125 
 
Unthreatened 0.015 0.047 0.031 0.040 0.013 0.306 0.274 0.104 
 
Threatened 0.057 0.090 0.054 0.054 0.031 0.315 0.301 0.129 
Grade 4 Total 
     
0.220 0.193 0.207 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.248 0.218 0.233 
 
Threatened 
     
0.215 0.188 0.202 
Grade 5 Total 0.141 0.130 0.074 0.085 0.041 0.403 0.354 0.175 
 
Unthreatened 0.092 0.088 0.044 0.057 0.021 0.354 0.322 0.140 
 
Threatened 0.151 0.138 0.080 0.091 0.045 0.413 0.360 0.183 
Grade 6 Total 
     
0.094 0.072 0.083 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.087 0.062 0.074 
 
Threatened 
     
0.095 0.074 0.085 
Grade 7 Total 
   
0.171 0.086 0.242 0.199 0.174 
 
Unthreatened 
   
0.145 0.084 0.246 0.207 0.171 
 
Threatened 
   
0.174 0.086 0.242 0.198 0.175 
Grade 8 Total 
     
0.090 0.111 0.101 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.067 0.060 0.064 
 
Threatened 
     
0.094 0.118 0.106 
          F.1d, Slack in reading (Model 4) 
       
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.129 0.124 0.094 0.055 0.057 0.183 0.235 0.125 
 
Unthreatened 0.090 0.098 0.075 0.043 0.043 0.150 0.199 0.100 
 
Threatened 0.137 0.130 0.098 0.058 0.059 0.190 0.243 0.131 
Grade 4 Total 
     
0.114 0.130 0.122 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.138 0.155 0.147 
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Threatened 
     
0.109 0.124 0.117 
Grade 5 Total 0.055 0.059 0.087 0.080 0.037 0.370 0.401 0.155 
 
Unthreatened 0.042 0.042 0.071 0.060 0.022 0.324 0.358 0.131 
 
Threatened 0.057 0.062 0.090 0.084 0.040 0.379 0.410 0.160 
Grade 6 Total 
     
0.078 0.101 0.089 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.098 0.121 0.109 
 
Threatened 
     
0.075 0.097 0.086 
Grade 7 Total 
   
0.151 0.130 0.170 0.196 0.162 
 
Unthreatened 
   
0.121 0.100 0.169 0.186 0.144 
 
Threatened 
   
0.155 0.133 0.170 0.198 0.164 
Grade 8 Total 
     
0.130 0.082 0.106 
 
Unthreatened 
     
0.147 0.031 0.089 
 
Threatened 
     
0.127 0.089 0.108 
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F.2, Indiana 
F.2a, Slack in Math (Model 3) 
      
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.014 0.030 0.020 
 
Unthreatened 0.011 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.019 0.013 
 
Threatened 0.026 0.018 0.017 0.014 0.033 0.022 
Grade 4 Total 
 
0.014 0.009 0.015 0.010 0.012 
 
Unthreatened 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.008 
 
Threatened 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.011 0.013 
Grade 5 Total 
 
0.029 0.016 0.021 0.019 0.021 
 
Unthreatened 0.016 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 
 
Threatened 0.032 0.018 0.025 0.021 0.024 
Grade 6 Total 0.022 0.021 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.012 
 
Unthreatened 0.009 0.017 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 
 
Threatened 0.025 0.022 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.013 
Grade 7 Total 
 
0.016 0.011 0.005 0.006 0.010 
 
Unthreatened 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
 
Threatened 0.018 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.010 
Grade 8 Total 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.007 0.011 
 
Unthreatened 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.006 
 
Threatened 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.008 0.011 
        F.2b, Slack in Reading (Model 3) 
      
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.007 
 
Unthreatened 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.004 
 
Threatened 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.008 
Grade 4 Total 
 
0.012 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.011 
 
Unthreatened 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.007 
 
Threatened 0.013 0.015 0.008 0.012 0.012 
Grade 5 Total 
 
0.017 0.020 0.014 0.016 0.016 
 
Unthreatened 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.009 
 
Threatened 0.019 0.023 0.016 0.017 0.019 
Grade 6 Total 0.021 0.026 0.031 0.041 0.034 0.031 
 
Unthreatened 0.013 0.017 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.021 
 
Threatened 0.023 0.028 0.033 0.044 0.036 0.033 
Grade 7 Total 
 
0.018 0.027 0.035 0.030 0.028 
 
Unthreatened 0.014 0.028 0.020 0.027 0.022 
 
Threatened 0.019 0.027 0.038 0.030 0.029 
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Grade 8 Total 0.032 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.030 0.025 
 
Unthreatened 0.014 0.014 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.022 
 
Threatened 0.033 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.030 0.025 
        F.2c, Slack in Math (Model 4) 
      
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.114 0.112 0.118 0.116 0.141 0.120 
 
Unthreatened 0.108 0.110 0.122 0.121 0.152 0.123 
 
Threatened 0.115 0.113 0.117 0.114 0.137 0.119 
Grade 4 Total 
 
0.107 0.092 0.093 0.070 0.090 
 
Unthreatened 0.093 0.078 0.086 0.059 0.079 
 
Threatened 0.111 0.096 0.095 0.073 0.094 
Grade 5 Total 
 
0.212 0.189 0.189 0.181 0.193 
 
Unthreatened 0.207 0.173 0.185 0.182 0.187 
 
Threatened 0.214 0.193 0.190 0.181 0.194 
Grade 6 Total 0.190 0.165 0.143 0.110 0.111 0.144 
 
Unthreatened 0.166 0.149 0.139 0.093 0.107 0.131 
 
Threatened 0.195 0.169 0.145 0.114 0.112 0.147 
Grade 7 Total 
 
0.214 0.230 0.196 0.215 0.214 
 
Unthreatened 0.167 0.193 0.173 0.191 0.181 
 
Threatened 0.223 0.238 0.199 0.219 0.220 
Grade 8 Total 0.069 0.065 0.075 0.068 0.058 0.067 
 
Unthreatened 0.056 0.060 0.065 0.040 0.035 0.051 
 
Threatened 0.070 0.066 0.075 0.070 0.059 0.068 
        F.2d, Slack in Reading (Model 4) 
      
  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Mean 
Grade 3 Total 0.080 0.087 0.083 0.104 0.094 0.089 
 
Unthreatened 0.069 0.081 0.082 0.104 0.092 0.086 
 
Threatened 0.083 0.088 0.083 0.104 0.095 0.090 
Grade 4 Total 
 
0.053 0.056 0.059 0.068 0.059 
 
Unthreatened 0.036 0.044 0.049 0.063 0.048 
 
Threatened 0.058 0.059 0.062 0.070 0.062 
Grade 5 Total 
 
0.133 0.140 0.137 0.151 0.140 
 
Unthreatened 0.111 0.116 0.125 0.145 0.124 
 
Threatened 0.139 0.147 0.141 0.153 0.145 
Grade 6 Total 0.084 0.077 0.067 0.075 0.082 0.077 
 
Unthreatened 0.070 0.067 0.058 0.070 0.077 0.069 
 
Threatened 0.088 0.080 0.070 0.077 0.084 0.079 
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Grade 7 Total 
 
0.072 0.085 0.076 0.065 0.075 
 
Unthreatened 0.052 0.064 0.065 0.053 0.058 
 
Threatened 0.076 0.089 0.078 0.067 0.078 
Grade 8 Total 0.032 0.038 0.047 0.054 0.054 0.045 
 
Unthreatened 0.033 0.032 0.047 0.048 0.042 0.040 
 
Threatened 0.032 0.038 0.047 0.054 0.055 0.045 
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Appendix G 
 
Second-Stage Results using 2001 Test Scores to Classify Schools 
 
G.1, Coefficients from 2nd-stage Models, Model 1 and Model 2, Minnesota 
Using Efficiency as Dependent Variable 
 
Efficiency in Math Efficiency in Reading 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.690 (0.003) 0.730 (0.006) 0.717 (0.003) 0.738 (0.005) 
Year 2002 -0.024 (0.010) -0.024 (0.010) -0.020 (0.008) -0.020 (0.008) 
Year 2003 0.007 (0.010) 0.008 (0.010) -0.003 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008) 
Year 2004 -0.012 (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) -0.017 (0.008) -0.016 (0.008) 
Year 2005 0.035 (0.010) 0.036 (0.010) 0.024 (0.008) 0.025 (0.008) 
Year 2006 -0.034 (0.009) 0.003 (0.013) 0.014 (0.008) 0.035 (0.011) 
Year 2007 -0.030 (0.009) 0.005 (0.013) -0.011 (0.008) 0.009 (0.011) 
Grade 4 -0.017 (0.004) -0.017 (0.004) -0.017 (0.003) -0.017 (0.003) 
Grade 5 -0.007 (0.002) -0.007 (0.002) 0.026 (0.002) 0.026 (0.002) 
Threatened*Year 2002 0.036 (0.011) 0.036 (0.011) 0.021 (0.009) 0.021 (0.009) 
Threatened*Year 2003 0.066 (0.011) 0.066 (0.011) 0.044 (0.009) 0.044 (0.009) 
Threatened*Year 2004 0.076 (0.011) 0.076 (0.011) 0.058 (0.009) 0.058 (0.009) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.105 (0.011) 0.104 (0.011) 0.074 (0.009) 0.073 (0.009) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.074 (0.010) 0.070 (0.014) 0.076 (0.008) 0.072 (0.012) 
Threatened*Year 2007 0.092 (0.010) 0.088 (0.014) 0.066 (0.008) 0.063 (0.012) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
-0.147 (0.037) 
  
-0.084 (0.031) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
0.019 (0.041) 
  
0.015 (0.034) 
         Middle Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.680 (0.009) 0.676 (0.013) 0.762 (0.008) 0.785 (0.011) 
Year 2005 0.019 (0.026) 0.018 (0.026) -0.002 (0.023) -0.002 (0.023) 
Year 2006 -0.067 (0.021) -0.117 (0.061) -0.061 (0.019) -0.050 (0.054) 
Year 2007 -0.065 (0.021) -0.115 (0.061) -0.097 (0.019) -0.085 (0.054) 
Grade 7 0.046 (0.008) 0.046 (0.008) 0.015 (0.007) 0.015 (0.007) 
Grade 8 0.027 (0.008) 0.027 (0.008) 0.018 (0.007) 0.018 (0.007) 
Threatened*Year 2005 0.102 (0.027) 0.103 (0.027) 0.062 (0.024) 0.062 (0.024) 
Threatened*Year 2006 0.005 (0.022) 0.052 (0.064) 0.039 (0.019) 0.077 (0.057) 
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Threatened*Year 2007 0.028 (0.022) 0.076 (0.064) 0.029 (0.019) 0.067 (0.056) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
0.092 (0.104) 
  
-0.021 (0.092) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
-0.086 (0.111) 
  
-0.079 (0.098) 
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G.2, Coefficients from 2nd-stage Models, Model 1 and Model 2, Minnesota 
Using Slack in ADV as Dependent Variable 
 
Slack in Math Slack in Reading 
Elementary Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.095 (0.003) 0.088 (0.005) 0.118 (0.002) 0.102 (0.004) 
Year 2002 0.021 (0.009) 0.021 (0.009) 0.007 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008) 
Year 2003 -0.012 (0.009) -0.013 (0.009) -0.004 (0.008) -0.004 (0.008) 
Year 2004 -0.006 (0.009) -0.006 (0.009) -0.025 (0.008) -0.026 (0.008) 
Year 2005 -0.034 (0.009) -0.035 (0.009) -0.040 (0.008) -0.041 (0.008) 
Year 2006 0.101 (0.008) 0.090 (0.011) -0.010 (0.007) -0.021 (0.010) 
Year 2007 0.064 (0.008) 0.054 (0.011) 0.007 (0.007) -0.004 (0.010) 
Grade 4 0.017 (0.003) 0.017 (0.003) -0.010 (0.003) -0.009 (0.003) 
Grade 5 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.029 (0.002) -0.029 (0.002) 
Threatened*Year 2002 0.011 (0.010) 0.011 (0.010) -0.008 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2003 -0.007 (0.010) -0.007 (0.010) -0.006 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2004 -0.008 (0.009) -0.008 (0.010) -0.013 (0.008) -0.013 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2005 -0.024 (0.010) -0.023 (0.010) -0.022 (0.008) -0.022 (0.008) 
Threatened*Year 2006 -0.038 (0.009) -0.032 (0.012) -0.019 (0.008) -0.022 (0.011) 
Threatened*Year 2007 -0.040 (0.009) -0.035 (0.012) -0.010 (0.008) -0.013 (0.011) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
0.043 (0.033) 
  
0.044 (0.029) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
-0.023 (0.036) 
  
0.011 (0.031) 
         Middle Schools Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Intercept 0.099 (0.007) 0.102 (0.010) 0.009 (0.006) 0.029 (0.009) 
Year 2005 -0.064 (0.019) -0.063 (0.019) -0.0004 (0.018) 0.0002 (0.018) 
Year 2006 -0.037 (0.016) -0.008 (0.045) 0.056 (0.015) 0.079 (0.044) 
Year 2007 -0.049 (0.016) -0.020 (0.045) 0.050 (0.015) 0.072 (0.043) 
Grade 7 0.082 (0.006) 0.082 (0.006) 0.122 (0.005) 0.121 (0.005) 
Grade 8 0.134 (0.006) 0.134 (0.006) 0.040 (0.005) 0.039 (0.005) 
Threatened*Year 2005 -0.026 (0.020) -0.026 (0.020) -0.003 (0.019) -0.002 (0.019) 
Threatened*Year 2006 -0.017 (0.017) -0.040 (0.048) -0.026 (0.016) -0.007 (0.046) 
Threatened*Year 2007 -0.012 (0.017) -0.035 (0.047) -0.009 (0.016) 0.010 (0.046) 
Pct_HighStakes 
  
-0.053 (0.077) 
  
-0.042 (0.074) 
Threatened*Pct_HighStakes
 
0.043 (0.083) 
  
-0.042 (0.079) 
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Appendix H 
 
Trends in Efficiency for Grade 4, 5, and 7, Indiana 
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Figure H.1, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 4 
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Figure H.2, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 5 
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Figure H.3, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 7
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Appendix I 
 
Trends in Efficiency in Science and Social Studies, South Carolina 
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Figure I.1, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 3 
 
138 
 
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year 
Unthreatened Threatened
Science
Trends in Efficiency for Grade 4
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
year 
Unthreatened Threatened
Social Science
Trends in Efficiency for Grade 4
 
Figure I.2, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 4 
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Figure I.3, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 5 
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Figure I.4, Trends in Efficiency for Grade 6 
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